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Summary findings
In the past few years a number of central banks have  exercise some degree of discretion without putting in
adopted inflation targeting for monetary policy. Agenor  jeopardy its main objective of maintaining stable prices.
provides an introduction to inflation targeting, with an  In middle- and high-income developing economies that
emphasis on analytical issues and the recent experience  can refrain from implicit exchange rate targeting, it can
of middle- and high-income developing countries (which  improve the design and performance of monetary policy
have relatively low inflation to begin with and reasonably  compared  with other policy approaches that central
well-functioning financial markets).  banks may follow.
After presenting a formal analytical framework,  Not all countries may be able to satisfy the technical
Agenor discusses the basic requirements for inflation  requirements  (such as adequate price data, adequate
targeting and how such a regime differs from money and  understanding of the links between instruments and
exchange rate targeting regimes.  targets of monetary policy, and adequate forecasting
After discussing the operational framework for  capabilities), but such requirements should not be
inflation targeting (including the price index to monitor,  overstated. Forecasting capability can never be perfect,
the time horizon, the forecasting procedures, and the  and sensible projections always involve qualitative
role of asset prices), he examines recent experiences with  judgment.
inflation targets, providing new evidence on the  More important,  and often more difficult, is the task
convexity of the Phillips curve for six developing  of designing or improving an institutional framework
countries.  that would allow the central bank to pursue the goal of
His conclusions: Inflation targeting is a flexible policy  low, stable inflation while maintaining the ability to
framework that allows a country's central bank to  stabilize fluctuations in output.
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21  Introduction
There  is growing acceptance  among both  policymakers and  economists that
the pursuit  of price stability  (defined as maintaining  a low and stable  rate of
inflation) is the main medium- to long-run  goal of monetary  policy. The first
reason  is the  recognition  that  a  high  and  variable  inflation  rate  is socially
and economically costly. These costs include price distortions,  lower savings
and  investment  (which  inhibits  growth),  hedging  (into  precious  metals  or
land) and  capital  flight (into foreign assets).  The second is that  experience
has shown that  short-term  manipulation  of monetary  policy instruments  to
achieve other  goals-such  as higher output  and  lower unemployment-may
conflict with  price stability.  The  attempt  to  achieve these conflicting goals
tends  to  generate  an  inflationary  bias  in  the  conduct  of monetary  policy
without, in the end, achieving systematically  higher output  and employment.
To achieve the  goal of price stability, monetary  policy in many countries
was for  a long  time  conducted  by  relying on intermediate  targets  such as
monetary  aggregates  or exchange rates.  During the  1990s, however, several
industrial  and developing countries have begun to  focus directly on inflation
itself. This new approach to the problem of controlling inflation through  mon-
etary  policy is known as inflation targeting.'  It essentially makes inflation-
rather  than  output  or unemployment-the  primary  goal of monetary  policy.
It also forces the central bank to predict  the future behavior of prices, giving
it the opportunity  to tighten  policies before sustained  inflationary  pressures
develop.
A large  literature  has  examined  the  practical  experience  of  industrial
countries  with  inflation  targeting  (see, most  recently,  Bernanke,  Laubach,
Mishkin, and Posen (1999), and Schaechter, Stone, and  Zelmer (2000)). The
purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of analytical  issues associated
with  inflation targeting,  with  a particular  focus on the policy and  structural
context  of developing countries and  their  recent  experience.  Whether  infla-
tion targeting  has a wider applicability  to  developing economies has  indeed
been a matter  of debate  in recent years, with authors  like Masson, Savastano
and  Sharma  (1997) taking  a rather  cautious  view.  It  has  been argued,  for
instance,  that  poor data on prices and real sector developments, the absence
of reliable procedures for forecasting inflation, the difficulty of maintaining  de
1As discussed below,  two major reasons why countries chose  to implement inflation tar-
geting over alternative monetary policy frameworks  were exchange  rate crises and money
demand instability.
3facto independence  for the central bank, and the lack of an anti-inflationary
history may preclude the establishment of a transparent framework for con-
ducting monetary policy and therefore any attempt  at  inflation targeting.
However,  others (including  Mishkin  (2000)  and Morande  and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1999))  have adopted a more favorable position at least for the case of high-
and middle-income  developing  countries, where the financial system is suf-
ficiently developed to permit  the use of indirect instruments of monetary
policy. Understanding the terms of this debate is essential because several
developing  countries have in recent years adopted floating  exchange rates (of-
ten as a result of unsustainable exchange rate pressures on their adjustable
peg regimes) and must therefore find another nominal anchor to guide do-
mestic monetary policy over the medium and long term.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents
an analytical framework for inflation targeting in  both  closed and  open
economies,  based on the important work of Svensson (1997b, 1999b). The
closed-economy  model provides the starting point for understanding the na-
ture of an inflation targeting regime;  it is then extended to an open-economy
setting to highlight the role of the exchange rate in the transmission process
of monetary policy. Section III compares inflation targeting regimes with
money supply and exchange rate targeting regimes and highlights the risks
associated  with pursuing implicit exchange  rate targets. Section IV identifies
three basic requirements for implementing an inflation targeting framework,
namely, central bank independence, the absence of implicit targeting of the
exchange rate,  and transparency in the conduct of monetary policy.  The
operational framework of inflation targeting is the focus of section V. It
discusses,  in particular, issues associated with the measurement of inflation
(including  sources of imperfection  in traditional measures), whether a target
band for inflation is more appropriate than a point target,  the time hori-
zon of monetary policy, the inherent difficulties  associated with forecasting
inflation, and whether asset prices should be taken into account in assess-
ing inflationary pressures. Section VI reviews  the recent experience of both
industrial and developing  countries with inflation targets, with a particular
emphasis on the latter group.  The last section focuses on some unresolved
analytical issues in the design of inflation targeting regimes,  namely the role
of nonlinearities and asymmetric effects (related to both the form of policy
preferences and structural  relationships, most notably the Phillips curve),
uncertainty (about behavioral parameters and the  transmission process of
monetary policy), and the treatment of credibility and reputation in empiri-
4cal macroeconomic models of inflation.  New results  regarding  the convexity
(or lack thereof)  of the  Phillips curve are also presented  for six developing
countries.  The  conclusion summarizes  the main  results  of the  analysis and
offers some final remarks.
2  Inflation  Targeting:  A  Conceptual  Frame-
work
The first step in understanding  the nature of an inflation targeting  framework
is to  analyze the  relation  between explicit  policy goals, policy instruments,
and preferences of the central bank (which affect the form of its reaction func-
tion).2 This  section  begins by examining the  link between inflation  targets
and  the  nominal  interest  rate  (viewed as the main  instrument  of monetary
policy) when the  central  bank  is concerned  only about  deviations  of actual
inflation from its target  value. The analysis is then  extended  to consider the
case in which both  output  and  inflation enter  the central  bank's  loss func-
tion. In both  cases the analysis focuses on a closed economy; open-economy
considerations  will be discussed later  on.
2.1  Strict  Inflation  Targeting
Following Svensson (1997b), consider a closed economy producing  one (com-
posite) good.  The economy's structure  is characterized  by the following two
equations,  where all parameters  are defined as positive:
7rt-  7rt-1  =  alYt-1  +  Et,  (1)
Yt = OlYt-i  - 2(it- 1 -7t-1)  + yt,  31 <  1,  (2)
where 7rt -Pt  - Pt-i  is the inflation rate  at t (with Pt denoting the logarithm
of the price level), Yt the  output  gap  (defined as the logarithm  of actual  to
potential  output),  and  it the  nominal  interest  rate  (taken  to  be under  the
direct  control  of the central  bank).  Et and  qt are independently,  identically
distributed  (i.i.d.)  random  shocks.
2In what follows  the term "instrument"  is used in a broad sense  to refer  both to the
operational  target of monetary  policy  and to the actual  instrument(s)  available  to achieve
this target.
5Equation  (1) indicates  that  changes in inflation are positively  related  to
the  cyclical component  of output,  with  a  lag of one period.  Equation  (2)
relates  the  output  gap  positively  to  its  value  in  the  previous  period  and
negatively  with  the  ex post  real  interest  rate,  again with  a one-period  lag.
In  this  model,  policy actions  (changes in  the  nominal  interest  rate)  affect
output  with  a one-period  lag and,  as implied  by (1),  inflation  with  a  two-
period lag.3 The lag between a change in the policy instrument  and inflation
will be referred to in what  follows as the  control lag or control horizon.
The assumption  that  the  central  bank  controls directly  the  interest  rate
that  affects aggregate  demand  warrants  some discussion.  In principle,  what
affects private consumption  and investment decisions is the cost of borrowing,
that  is, given the  characteristics  of the  financial  structure  that  prevails in
many developing countries,  the bank  lending rate.  In general,  bank  lending
rates  depend  on  banks'  funding  costs,  a key component  of which  is either
the money market  rate  or (ultimately)  the cost of short-term  financing from
the  central bank.4 Thus,  to the extent  that  bank  lending rates  (and  money
market  rates)  respond  quickly and  in a  stable  manner  to  changes in policy
rates,  the  assumption  that  the  central  bank  controls  directly  the  cost  of
borrowing  faced  by  private  agents  can  be  viewed simply  as  a  convenient
shortcut.5 What,  then,  is the  evidence?  Figure  1 reports  impulse  response
functions of a one-standard  deviation increase in the central bank's  discount
rate  (taken  to  be  the  policy  rate)  in  a  group  of six  developing  countries
for which data  were readily  available.  These responses are obtained  from a
bivariate  vector  autoregression  (VAR) model that  includes  the  policy  rate
and  the  money market  rate  (see Appendix  B for details).  The figure shows
3Note that introducing  a forward-looking  element  in equation (1) would  imply that
monetary  policy  has some  effect  on contemporaneous  inflation;  this would  make  the solu-
tion of the model  more  complicated  but would  not affect  some  of the key  results discussed
below.  See  Appendix  A, which  dwells  on Clarida,  Galf  and Gertler  (1999),  for  a discussion.
Nevertheless,  it should  be kept in mind  that the assumption  of model-consistent  expecta-
tions also  has drawbacks;  in particular,  it downplays  the role  of model  uncertainty-which,
as discussed  later, may be very important  in practice.
4Bank lending  rates also depend  on the perceived  probability  of default of potential
borrowers  and, in an open economy,  the cost of funding  on world  capital markets. See
Agenor  and Aizenman  (1998)  for a model  that captures  these  features  of bank behavior.
5Note that if aggregate demand depends on longer-term interest rates, a similar effect
would  arise.  This is because  longer-term  rates are driven in part by expected future
movements  in short-term interest rates, which are, in turn, influenced  by current and
expected  future  policy  decisions  of the central  bank.
6that  (except  for Uruguay)  market  interest  rates  respond  relatively  quickly
and  significantly to  changes in official interest  rates.  These  results  suggest
therefore  that  it is a  reasonable  analytical  approximation  to  assume,  as  is
done here, that  the central bank controls directly the interest  rate that  affects
aggregate demand.
The central  bank's  period-by-period  policy loss function,  Lt,  is taken  for
the moment  to be a function only of inflation and is given by
Lt =  (7rt  _ ~r)  2  (3)
2
where 7r  is the inflation target.  An alternative assumption would be to assume
that  the the price target  is specified in terms of the price level, as opposed to
the  inflation rate.  The conventional view is that  a price level target  entails,
on the  one  hand,  a major  benefit  in  that  it reduces uncertainty  about  the
future  level of prices.  On the  other,  if the  economy is subject  to  (supply)
shocks that  alter the  equilibrium price level, attempts  to disinflate and lower
the price level back to its pre-shock value may generate significant real costs
and  increased  volatility  in inflation  and  output.6 In practice,  as discussed
later,  all inflation-targeting  central  banks  have opted  to  define their  price
objective in terms of the inflation rate;  accordingly, it will be assumed in the
present that  the price target  is indeed specified in terms of the inflation rate.
The  central  bank's  policy objective  in  period  t  is to  choose a  sequence
of current and future interest rates {ih}h=t  so as to minimize, subject to (1)
and (2), the expected sum of discounted squared deviations of actual inflation
from its target  value, Ut:
minUt  =  E  6  Lh  < 6 < 1,  (4)
h=t  h=t
where  6 denotes  a  discount factor  and  Et the  expectations  operator  condi-
tional  upon the  central bank's  information  set at period t.
The most direct way to solve this optimization  problem is to use dynamic
programming  techniques.  As shown by Svensson (1997b), however, problem
6This  argument,  however,  has  been  challenged  in  some  recent  papers,  including
Dittmar,  Gavin,  and  Kydland  (1999),  Svensson  (1999a),  and  Vestin  (2000).  The  lat-
ter  two  studies,  in  particular,  show  that  under  certain  conditions  price-level  targeting
may deliver a more favorable trade-off  between  inflation  and  output  variability  than  does
inflation  targeting.
7(3) can be recast in a simpler form, which allows a more intuitive  derivation
of the optimal  path  of the policy instrument.  To begin with,  note first that,
because  the  nominal  interest  rate  affects inflation  with  a  two-period  lag,
7rt+2  can be expressed in terms  of period t variables and  shocks occurring  at
periods t + 1 and  t + 2. Equation  (1) can thus  be written  as
7rt+2  =  7rt+l  + alyt+i +  Et+2.
Updating  (2) in a similar manner  and substituting  the result in the above
expression for Yt+i yields
7rt+2  =  (7rt + alYt  +  E+,) +  a,il[ 3 Yt  - / 2(it  - lrt) + '1t+ll +  Ct+2,
that  is
7rt+2  =  al7rt  +  a2Yt - a3it  +  Zt+2,  (5)
where
Zt+2  =  Et+2 +  ±t+l  + a1?7t+i,
a, 1 =+  091±3 2,  a2 =  al(l  +  01),  a3 =  a13 2.
FRom (5), it is clear  that  the interest  rate  set  at period  t  by the  central
bank  will affect  inflation in  year t +  2 and  beyond,  but  not  in years  t  and
t +  1; similarly, the  interest  rate  set  in period  t +  1 will affect inflation  in
periods  t + 3 and  beyond,  but  not  in periods  t +  1 and  t +  2; and  so on.
The solution to  the optimization  problem described  earlier can therefore  be
viewed as consisting of setting the nominal interest  rate in period t (and then
t + 1, t + 2, ...) so that  the expected inflation in period t + 2 (and then  t + 3,
t + 4, ...)  is equal to  the  target  rate.  Put  differently, because  from  (5) ?rt+2
is affected only by it and  not by it+,,  it+ 2 ,**.,  the  problem  of minimizing  the
objective function Ut in (4) boils down to a sequence of one-period  problems,
82
min -Et(7rt+ 2 - T)2 ± Xtr  (6)
it  2
subject  to  (5), with
xtE  {  E  minhEt  [(7rh+2  ] }
8Because xt in (6) does not depend on it, the central bank's  optimization
problem  at period t  consists simply of minimizing the expected,  discounted
squared value of (7rt+2 - *)  with respect to it:
32
min  2 Et(7rt+ 2 - ft)2.  (7)
Note that,  from standard  statistical  results,7
Et(7rt+ 2 _  )2  =  (7rt+21t  - r)2 + Vt(7rt+2),  (8)
where 7rt+21t  =Et7rt+2. This  expression indicates  that  the  central  bank's  op-
timization  problem  can  be  equivalently  viewed as minimizing  the  sum  of
expected future squared  deviations of inflation from target  (the squared  bias
in future inflation,  (7't+2[t  -,Tr) 2) and the variability  of future inflation condi-
tional on information available at t, Vt(7rt+ 2). Because Vt(7rt+ 2) is independent
of the policy choice, the problem consists in minimizing the squared  bias  in
future inflation.
Using (5), the first-order condition  of problem  (7) is given by
32Et  {  (7rt+2 - }  =  -6 2a3(7rt+21t  - 7r) =  0,
implying that
7rt+21t =XT  (9)
Equation  (9) shows that,  given the  two-period  control  lag, the  optimal
policy for the  central bank  is to  set the  nominal  interest  rate  such that  the
expected rate  of inflation for period t + 2 (relative to period t + 1) based on
information  available at period t be equal to the inflation target.
To  derive explicitly  the  interest  rate  rule,  note  that  from  (5),  because
Etzt+2  0=  , 7rt+21t  is given by
lrt+21t  =  alwt  + a2yt  - a3it,  (10)
which implies that,  given the definition of a1,
- -(7rt+21t  - 7rt)  +  ai/3
27rt  +  a2yt
a 3
7This standard  result  is E(x  - X*)2  =  (Ex - X*)2 + V(X),  that  is, the  expected  squared
value of  a  random  variable  equals  the  square  of the  bias  plus  the  conditional  variance.
Decomposition  (8) will prove useful  for the  discussion later  on of the  role of uncertainty.
9This result  shows that,  in particular,  because interest  rate  changes affect
inflation with  a lag, monetary  policy must  be conducted  in part  on the ba-
sis of forecasts;  the  larger  the  amount  by which the  current  inflation  rate
(which is predetermined  up to  a random  shock, as  implied by (1)) exceeds
the forecast, the higher the interest  rate.  The fact that  the inflation  forecast
can be considered  an  intermediate  policy target is the reason  why Svensson
(1999b) refers to inflation targeting  as inflation forecast targeting.  The  use
of conditional  inflation forecasts as intermediate  targets  in the policy rule is
optimal,  given the  quadratic  structure  of policy preferences. 8
The inflation  forecast  can readily  be related  to  the  current,  observable
variables of the model.  To do so requires setting  expression  (10) equal to  ir
and  solving for it:
-?  al7rt+  a2yt
tt=
a3
Given the  definitions  of the  ah  coefficients given above, this  expression
can  be  rewritten  to  give the  following explicit  form  of the  central  bank's
reaction  function:
it  =  rt +  b, (-Ft - )  +  b2Yt,  (l
where
1  b2  1+ 
Q13
2 / 2
Equation  (11) indicates that  it is optimal  for the central  bank  to  adjust
the nominal interest  rate upward to reflect current  inflation (to a full extent),
the difference between current and desired inflation rates, as well as increases
in the  output  gap.  As emphasized  by Svensson  (1997b, p.  1119), the  rea-
son why current  inflation appears  in the optimal  policy rule is not  because
current  inflation  is a  policy  target  but  because  it  helps  (together  with  the
contemporaneous  output  gap)  predict  future  inflation,  as implied  by  (10).
It  is also important  to note  that  rule  (11) is  certainty-equivalent:  the same
interest  rate  rule would be optimal  in the absence of shocks.  Although  the
central bank cannot  prevent temporary  deviations of actual inflation from its
'As noted by Bernanke and Woodford (1997),  this result does not imply that the central
bank  should  react  mechanically  to private-sector  forecasts.  The reason  is that  there  is a
risk of  "perverse  circularity",  which  stems  from  the  fact  that  private  agents  may  find it
optimal to forecast  inflation equal to the  announced  policy target,  depriving  thereby  their
forecasts of any  informational  value for the  central  bank.
10target  value, it can ensure that  the effects of such shocks do not persist  over
time.9
In equilibrium,  actual inflation in year t + 2 will deviate from the inflation
forecast 7rt+2It  and the inflation target,  7r,  only by the forecast error  Zt+2,  due
to shocks occurring within the control lag, after the central  bank  has set the
interest  rate  to its optimal  value:
Tt+2  - 7rt+21t  +  Zt+2,
or
7rt+2-7r - Zt+2-  (12)
The  fact  that  even by  following an  optimal  instrument-setting  rule the
central bank cannot prevent deviations from the inflation target  due to shocks
occurring within the control lag is important  in assessing the performance of
inflation targeting  regimes in practice.
2.2  Policy  Trade-offs  and  Flexible  Targeting
Consider now the case in which the central bank is concerned not only about
inflation but also about  the size of the output  gap.  Specifically, suppose that
the instantaneous  policy loss function  (3) is now given by
(7'rt - -R)2  Ay2 Lt  =  +  A8,  )  > 0,  (13)
where A measures the relative weight attached  to cyclical movements  in out-
put.'"  The expected  sum of discounted policy losses is now given by
Ut =  Et  {Z6h-t  [(rh  2) + AYh]}  (14)
Deriving the  optimal  interest  rate  rule when both  inflation  and  output
enter  the objective  function  is more involved than  was previously the  case.
Essentially, the problem of minimizing  (14) cannot  be  "broken down" into a
9This,  of course, results  from  the  fact  that  shocks  have been  assumed  to be  i.i.d.  In
practice,  however, shocks are often persistent;  as discussed  later,  this  may have important
implications  under parameter  uncertainty.
10Note  that,  because  the  "bliss  level" of  the  output  gap  is zero,  there  is  no  built-in
inflationary  bias in this  specification;  see Cukierman  (1992) and  the  discussion  below.
11series of one-period  problems because of the dependence of current  inflation
on  lagged  output  and  the  dependence  of current  output  on  lagged  infla-
tion.  Using standard  dynamic  programming  techniques,  Svensson  (1997b,
pp.  1140-43) showed that  the first-order condition  for minimizing  (14) with
respect  to the nominal  interest  rate  can be written  as
7rt+2t=  - Yt+t,  (15)
where /c > 0 is given by
/c 2  1 - p  + F/(1  +  /j)2  + 4A/al2}
and
=  A(1  - 6)
Condition (15) implies that  the  inflation forecast  7rt+2 1t  will be  equal to
the  inflation  target  * only  if the  one-period  ahead  expected  output  gap  is
zero (yt+llt = 0).  In general, as long as A > 0, 7rt+21t  will exceed (fall short of)
* if the  output  gap is negative  (positive).  The reason  is that  if the  output
gap  is expected  to  be  negative for instance  at  t +  1, the  central  bank  will
attempt  to mitigate  the fall in activity  by lowering interest  rates  at t  (given
the  one-period  lag);  this  policy will therefore  lead  to  higher  inflation  than
otherwise at t + 2, thereby  raising the  inflation forecast  made at t  for t + 2.
The  higher A (the relative  weight on output  fluctuations  in the  policy loss
function) is, the larger the impact of the expected output  gap on the inflation
forecast will be."
An alternative  formulation  of the  optimality  condition  (15) can be  ob-
tained  by noting that,  from (1), with  EtEt+1  = 0,
Yt+ijt =  Irt+21t - 7rt+llt
Substituting  this  result  in (15) and rearranging  terms  yields
7rt+21t  - *r  =  C(7rt+llt -*),  0 < C  2  <  1-  (16)
"The  policy  loss  function  (13)  can  be  further  extended  to  account  for interest  rate
smoothing  by adding  the  squared  value of changes  in it.  As shown by  Svensson (1997b),
an instrument-smoothing  objective  would make the  inflation forecast  deviate  further  from
the  inflation target-this  time to reduce  costly fluctuations  in interest  rates.
12This expression indicates that  the deviation of the two-year inflation fore-
cast from the inflation target  is proportional  to the deviation of the one-year
forecast from the target;  when A =  0, c = 0 and the previous result (equation
(9)) holds.  The implication of this  analysis is that,  when cyclical movements
in output  matter  for the central bank, it is optimal to adjust  gradually the in-
flation forecast to the inflation target.  By doing so, the central bank  reduces
fluctuations  in output.  As shown again  by Svensson (1997b, pp.  1143-44),
the higher the weight on output  in the policy loss function  is (the  higher A
is), the more gradual  the adjustment  process will be  (the larger c will be).
The interest  rate  rule can be derived explicitly  by noting  that,  from  (1)
and  (2),
t+llt  =  2rt  + ClYt,  7rt+21t  = 7Tt+llt  +  ±lYt+11t,
Yt+1It  =  lyt-  2(t  - 7t)-
Substituting  the first  and third  expressions in the second yields
7rt+21t  =  7rt + Ce(1  +  ± 1)yt - a, 2(it - 7t).  (17)
Equating  (16) and  (17) and rearranging  terms  implies that
it=  7rt  + b1(7rt  -,r)  + b2yt,  (18)
where
bl,  c  b'2  - ;  0 b'  1  2'  02__  _
from which it can be verified that  b'  = bi and  b' =  b 2 when A = 0 (and thus
c =  0).  Equation  (18) indicates  that  the optimal  instrument  rule requires,
as before, the nominal  interest  rate to respond positively  to current  inflation
and the output  gap, as well as the excess of current  inflation over the target.
However, an important  difference between reaction functions  (11) and  (18) is
that  the  coefficients of (18) are smaller,  due to the positive weight attached
to  cyclical movements  in  output  in  the  policy  loss function.1 2 This  more
gradual response implies that  the (expected)  length of adjustment  of current
inflation  to  its  target  value, following a disturbance,  will take  longer than
the minimum two periods given by the control horizon.  The time it takes for
expected  inflation  to  return  to  target  following a  (permanent)  unexpected
'2Note also that in both cases the parameters  characterizing  the optimal  policy rule
continue  to be independent  of variances  of the shocks  affecting  inflation  and output. This
is because certainty equivalence  holds in both cases (see the discussion below).
13shock is known as the  implicit targeting horizon or simply as the  target horH-
zon. Naturally,  the length  of the implicit target  horizon is positively  related
not only to  the magnitude  of the shock and its degree of persistence  but  also
to the relative importance  of output  fluctuations  in the central bank's  objec-
tive function.  As can  be inferred  from the numerical  simulations  of Batini
and  Nelson  (2000), it also depends  on the  origin  of the  shock-whether  it
is, for instance,  an  aggregate  demand  shock  or a  supply-side  shock.  This
is because the transmission  lag of policy adjustments  depends  in general on
the type of shocks that  the economy is subject  to,  and the channels through
which these shocks influence the behavior  of private  agents.
A simple  illustration  of the  concepts  of control  lag and  target  horizon
is provided  in  Figure  2.  Suppose that  initially  the  rate  of inflation  is on
target  at  *  and  the  output  gap  is zero.  Rkom (11)  and  (18),  under  either
form of inflation targeting,  the initial  nominal  interest  rate  is thus  equal to
-k. Suppose that  the economy is subject  to an unexpected  random  shock at
t = 0 (an increase in, say, government spending)  that  leads to an increase  in
the  inflation rate  to 7ro  >  ir.  As implied by the reaction  function  under  both
strict  and flexible inflation targeting,  the central bank will raise immediately
the nominal  interest  rate;  but,  because inflation is predetermined  (monetary
policy affects inflation with  a two-period lag), actual  inflation remains at  7ro
in  period  t  =  1.  The  behavior  of inflation  for t  >  1 depends  on the  value
of A.  If A =  0 (the  central  bank  attaches  no weight to  movements  in  the
output  gap)  inflation  will return  to  its  target  value  at  exactly  the  control
horizon, that  is, in period t = 2. The nominal interest  rate  increases initially
to  io =  7ro  + bi(nro  - )  and  returns  to  ir at  period  t  =  1 and  beyond;  the
output  gap  does not  change at  t  =  0 but  falls to  y,  <  0 in  period  t  =  1,
before returning  to  its  initial  value of 0 at  period  t  =  2 and  beyond.  By
contrast,  with  A >  0, convergence of inflation to  its  target  value may take
considerably longer; the figure assumes, to fix ideas, that  convergence occurs
at  t  =  8.13 The  interest  rate  increases  initially  to  io =  iro + bl(iro - r)  <
io, which limits  the faUl  in the output  gap  to y  < yi.  Although  falling over
time,  the  interest  rate  remains  above its  equilibrium  value *r until  period
t  =  6  (given the  two-period  control  lag) whereas  the  output  gap  remains
negative until  period t =  7. In general, the higher A  is, the flatter  will be the
13With  an instrument-smoothing  objective  in the policy  loss  function,  returning  inflation
to its target value  could  take even  longer  because  the central  bank is also concerned  about
large movements  in interest rates.  Note that, strictly speaking,  convergence  of actual
inflation  to target when  A  > O  occurs  only asymptotically,  for t -*  oc.
14path  of inflation, interest  rates  and the output  gap for t  > 1.
Thus, the central bank's  output  stabilization  goal has a crucial effect not
only on the determination  of short-term  interest  rates but  also on the speed at
which the inflation rate adjusts  toward its target  after a shock. It can also be
shown that  policy preferences affect the  variability of output  and  inflation;
and  in the  presence  of supply  shocks, flexible inflation  targeting  entails  a
trade-off between inflation variability  and output-gap  variability.  By varying
the relative weight attached  by the central bank to the two policy goals in its
loss function, it is possible to derive an  "optimal  policy frontier"  (or optimal
trade-off curve), which can be defined (following Fuhrer  (1997a, p.  226)) as
the set of efficient combinations of inflation variability  and output  variability
attainable  by policymakers." 4 The  slope of the output-inflation  variability
frontier  is also related  to  the slope of the  aggregate  supply  curve (Cechetti
and  Ehrmann  (1999)):  the  flatter  the  aggregate  supply  curve,  the  larger
the increase in  output  variability  that  accompanies a  reduction  in inflation
variability.  In addition,  the  higher the  relative  weight attached  to  output
fluctuations  in the policy loss function, the longer it will take for inflation to
converge to its target  value following a shock.
2.3  Inflation  Targeting  in  an  Open  Economy
In  an  open  economy, the  exchange  rate  is  an  essential  component  of the
transmission  mechanism of monetary  policy; it affects the target  variables of
monetary  policy (inflation and the output  gap) through  a variety of channels.
There  is a direct  exchange rate  channel via the impact  of prices of imported
final goods on domestic  consumer prices with,  generally, a  relatively  short
lag.  There are also two indirect channels, operating  through  both  aggregate
demand and  aggregate supply. By altering the real exchange rate,  the nomi-
nal exchange rate  affects aggregate demand,  typically with  a lag (due to the
time it takes for consumers to respond to relative price changes); this  affects
the output  gap and,  with another  lag, inflation.  The exchange rate  may also
affect aggregate  supply  (with or without  a lag), because costs of production
may depend  on the  cost  of imported  intermediate  inputs,  whereas  nominal
wages may depend on (actual or expected) changes in consumer prices caused
by exchange rate  changes (see Agenor and  Montiel (1999, Chapter  8)).  In
140f course,  the existence  of a long-run  tradeoff  between  the variances of output and
inflation  does not imply  a long-run  tradeoff  between  the levels  of these variables.  In the
present  setting,  such  a tradeoff  only exists  in the short run.
15turn,  the exchange rate  is affected by interest-rate  differentials,  foreign dis-
turbances,  and  expectations  of future  exchange rates  and  risk premia  that
depend on domestic factors, such as the size of the domestic public debt or the
degree of credibility of the inflation target.  The exchange rate  is thus impor-
tant  under  inflation targeting  in an open economy, both  in transmitting  the
effects of changes in policy interest  rates and  in transmitting  various distur-
bances." 5 Because foreign shocks are transmitted  through  the exchange rate,
and the  exchange rate  affects consumer price inflation, stabilizing  exchange
rates  has remained  an important  consideration  under inflation  targeting.
These various channels can be captured  in a relatively  simple generaliza-
tion  of the  closed-economy model  presented  earlier.  Suppose now that  the
economy produces  two goods, tradables  and  nontradables,  with  the foreign-
currency  price of tradables  set on world markets.  The  economy's structure
is characterized  by the following set of equations:
7tN  = Let  + ajYt-1 + Et,  (19)
Yt  =  -i 2(it- 1 - 7rt-1) +  0 3(Aet,-_  7r1)  +  n7t  /3  > 0,  (20)
?rt  = 6z7N+  (1-6)Aet,  O  < 6 < 1,  (21)
it  it  + Eet+ 1 - et + (t,  (22)
Etet+l =  et - O(Aet - 7N),  0 > 0,  (23)
where et denotes (the logarithm  of) the nominal exchange rate,  7T  the infla-
tion rate  in nontradables,  i* the world interest  rate,  and  (t  an  i.i.d.  random
disturbance.
Equation  (19) is a Phillips-curve  relationship,  which is now assumed  to
hold only for the  nontraded  good sector.  It  differs from (1) in two respects:
there is no lagged effect of nontradable  inflation, and the rate  of depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate  is taken to have a direct  and immediate  impact
on the  rate  of increase  in prices of nontraded  goods.  As noted  earlier,  this
effect may reflect the supply-side  impact of changes in the price of imported
" 5The effects of interest rates and exchange  rates on aggregate demand may also depend
on the structure of indebtedness of the economy. For instance, in a country with a large
foreign  debt, exchange-rate changes may have important wealth and balance sheet effects,
possibly  offsetting  their  direct  effects on aggregate  demand.
16intermediate  goods.  Equation  (20) is the  aggregate  demand  for nontraded
goods; it has  a form similar to  (2) with  two modifications:  there  is no own
lagged effect (01 =  0) and  changes in the real exchange rate  (as given by the
difference between the rate of nominal  depreciation  and  the rate  of nontrad-
able inflation)  are assumed to  affect positively the  demand  for home goods
with  a lag.  Equation  (21) defines aggregate inflation  as a weighted average
of inflation in nontradables  and  tradables;  for simplicity, the world price of
tradables  is assumed  constant  so that  its  rate  of change  is zero.  Equation
(22) is the uncovered interest  parity  condition,  which relates  domestic inter-
est rates  to the world interest  rate  (assumed constant),  the expected  rate of
depreciation  of the  nominal  exchange rate,  and  a serially  uncorrelated  ran-
dom term.  Finally,  (23) relates  expectations  of future  nominal  depreciation
to  contemporaneous  movements  in  the  real  exchange  rate:  if nontradable
inflation  is rising faster  than  the  rate  at  which the  nominal  exchange  rate
is depreciating,  the current  real exchange rate  is appreciating;  this,  in turn,
creates expectations  of a future  nominal depreciation.
There  are two types of issues that  can be explored by studying  inflation
targeting rules in an open-economy setting.  The first is whether the exchange
rate channel matters  for output  stability.  To address this issue, suppose that
the  policy objective  is given by  (14), which assumes that  the  central  bank
targets  aggregate inflation,  7rt.  Solving the  model  given by  (19)-(23)  and
(14) using the  same dynamic  programming  approach  proposed  by Svensson
(1997b), it can be shown that  inflation targeting  can destabilize  output  in an
open economy.  The reason is the effect of changes in the nominal  exchange
rate  on inflation  through  tradable  prices.  Because  it is the  fastest  channel
from  monetary  policy  to  inflation  in  this  model,  large  movements  in  the
exchange rate can produce excessive fluctuations  in output  by inducing large
changes in interest  rates."6  Clearly, because the traded  and nontraded  sectors
may react  differently in the short  run  to  movements  in the  (real)  exchange
rate,  the  destabilizing  effect on  aggregate output  can  be  mitigated  if the
central  bank  attaches  different weights to fluctuations  in sectoral output  in
its  objective function  (see Leitemo (1999)).  In general,  however, simulation
studies  have tended  to corroborate  this  prediction.
The  second issue that  can be  addressed  with  an open-economy model is
16Ball (1999) was one of the first to establish this result.  Jadresic (1999) also showed
that  targeting the overall price level may destabilize output  in a model with staggered
price setting if policymakers cannot observe current realizations of aggregate output and
inflation. The generality of this result, however,  is unclear at this stage.
17whether  targeting  inflation  in  nontradable  prices only  is more  appropriate
than  targeting  aggregate  inflation.  The  instantaneous  policy  loss function
given by  (13) assumes that  the central  bank  targets  aggregate inflation,  7rt.
If instead the central bank  chooses to target  nontradable inflation, its instan-
taneous loss function  would take the form'7
(L N  - N)2  A2  (24)
Lt  =  t2  _.+-2.  24
To analyze this issue, consider for instance a shock unrelated  to fundamen-
tals that  causes a persistent  depreciation  of the nominal exchange rate-say,
a large and sustained  outflow of short-term  capital  due to  an adverse shift in
confidence (Bharucha  and  Kent (1998)).  The immediate  effect is an increase
in inflation in the traded  goods sector. If, for instance,  firms producing home
goods use imported  intermediated  inputs  (or if nominal  wages are indexed
to  the overall price level) inflationary  pressures will also develop in the non-
tradable  goods sector and prices there may also rise, compounding  the initial
increase  in tradable  prices.  Targeting  aggregate  inflation may  involve sub-
stantial  adjustment  in  the  interest  rate  and  increased  volatility  in output.
By contrast,  if the  central bank  is targeting  only nontradable  inflation,  the
adjustment  of the interest  rate would be less of a lower magnitude,  and out-
put  and  nontradable  inflation  would be  less variable-albeit  at  the  cost of
greater  variability  in the nominal exchange rate  and aggregate  inflation.
However, as can be shown by solving the  model described  earlier  using
either  (13) or (24) as the policy loss function,  whether nontradable  inflation
targeting  is strictly  preferable  to  aggregate  inflation  targeting  depends  in
general on the nature  of the shocks hitting  the economy, in addition  to their
relative size. In fact, targeting  nontradable  inflation may produce undesirable
outcomes when the economy is subject  to shocks other than  to the exchange
rate.  For instance,  in response to  demand  or supply shocks, a central  bank
17A more general  specification  than (24) would account for the possibility  that the
central  bank is also concerned  about large  shifts in competitiveness.  Its period-by-period
policy  loss  function  would  therefore  look  like  this, in case  of aggregate  inflation  targeting:
(Ir  _ -F)
2 AyN
2 2(et  W  >O.
It  is intuitively clear that  concerns about  real exchange rate  fluctuations would also
affect  the  optimal  instrument  rule-in  the  sense of making  policy  changes  more  gradual
than  they  would otherwise be-as  shown earlier when minimizing  output  fluctuations  was
introduced  as an  additional  policy  objective.  See Svensson  (1999b) for a discussion.
18with  a  nontradable  inflation  target  is likely to  attempt  to  restore  inflation
on its targeted  path rapidly.  This would occur through  large adjustments  in
the interest  rate-which  would entail greater  volatility in the  exchange rate
and  aggregate inflation.
In sum, whereas an aggregate inflation target  may induce excessive volatil-
ity in the  interest  rate  (and  thus  output)  to offset exchange  rate  shocks, a
nontradable  inflation target  may induce excessive volatility  in the exchange
rate  as the policy instrument  is adjusted  to offset supply  or demand  shocks.
Indeed,  in  the  simulation  results  presented  by Bharucha  and  Kent  (1998),
neither  aggregate inflation targeting  nor nontradable  inflation targeting  pro-
duced  consistently  lower volatility  in  both  product  and  financial  markets
across all types  of shocks.
3  Comparison  with  Intermediate  Target  Strate-
gies
Price stability  as a medium-  to long-term goal can be achieved, in principle,
not only by focusing directly on the final objective itself, the inflation rate or
the price level, but  also by adopting  either  a pegged nominal  exchange rate
or a monetary  target  as an intermediate  goal. This section reviews these two
alternative  frameworks for monetary  policy and compares them with inflation
targeting.
3.1  Monetary  vs.  Inflation  Targeting
Monetary  targeting  presumes the existence of a stable relationship  between
one or more monetary  aggregates  and the general level of prices.  When this
is the  case, monetary  policy can be  directed  at  a particular  rate  of growth
in the monetary  aggregate  (the intermediate  objective)  compatible  with  low
inflation.  Specifically, monetary  targeting requires adequate knowledge of the
parameters  characterizing  the demand for money. In an economy undergoing
rapid financial liberalization,  however, these parameters  (notably  the interest
elasticity  of money  demand)  may be  highly unstable.  In  such  conditions
money ceases to  be a good predictor  of future inflation; that  is, the relation
between  the  intermediate  target  and  the  final objective  becomes unstable.
Similarly, in a context  of disinflation, the demand for money may be subject
to large and unpredictable  shifts; as a consequence, the information  content
19of money for future  inflation will be very low. Both  arguments  suggest that
relying on monetary  aggregates can be potentially  risky. In addition,  suppose
that  monetary  targeting  is viewed as minimizing  money  growth  variability
around  the money-growth  target-a  characterization  that  is fairly adequate
if the policy loss is quadratic.  As shown by Svensson (1997b), this policy goal
may be in conflict with  the objective of minimizing inflation variability;  that
is, there  often is a conflict between stabilizing inflation  around  the inflation
target  and  stabilizing  money growth  around  the monetary  target.  In  fact,
monetary  targeting  will in  general  imply greater  inflation  variability  than
inflation  targeting.  By inducing  higher volatility  in  interest  rates,  it  also
leads to increased variability  in output  (Clarida,  Gaif, and Gertler  (1999))."
Several industrial  countries  have indeed adopted  inflation targeting  after
abandoning  (or being abandoned  by) their monetary  targets  due to increased
distortions  in the link between the money supply and  overall prices, as doc-
umented  for instance  by Estrella  and  Mishkin (1997). 9  It  is worth  noting,
however, that  although  some researchers  have argued that  the  relationship
between  monetary  aggregates  and  prices has  also  weakened  in  developing
countries  (see for instance  Mishkin and  Savastano  (2000, p.  22) for Latin
America) systematic  formal evidence on this  issue remains limited  (particu-
larly for the late  1990s) and  subject  to different  interpretations.  The  study
by Arrau,  De Gregorio, Reinhart  and Wickham (1995), for instance,  showed
that  the alleged instability  in money demand  documented  in several studies
focusing on  developing countries  during  the  1980s may well have been  the
result of an omitted  variable, namely financial innovation.
3.2  Exchange  Rate  vs.  Inflation  Tairgeting
Many countries  (particularly  in the  developing world) have viewed pegging
their  nominal  exchange  rate  to  a stable  low-inflation foreign currency  as a
means to achieve domestic price stability, through  a "disciplining mechanism"
'8See  McCallum  (1999)  for a further discussion  of the lack of efficiency  of monetary
targeting.
" 9It has also been argued  that, in practice,  the lack of stability and predictability  in
the assumed  relationships  between  interest rates and the target monetary  aggregate,  and
between  the target aggregate  and inflation,  have  been well  recognized  in those countries
that have  pursued  monetary  targeting. See,  for instance,  the discussion  of German  mone-
tary policy  in Bernanke  et al. (1999).  Studies  of the reaction  function  of the Bunbesbank
suggest  also that real variables  have had a significant  influence  on policy decisions,  in
addition  to monetary  variables.  See Clarida,  Galf and Gertler  (1998a).
20with  two dimensions.  First,  to  the  extent  that  higher domestic  relative  to
foreign inflation results in a real exchange rate appreciation,  the demand  for
domestic  goods would fall and  induce a cyclical downswing that  would put
downward pressure  on  domestic  prices.  Second,  to  the  extent  that  wage-
and  price-setting  decisions anticipate  these  consequences of wage and  price
increases being too high, they would make higher domestic inflation less likely
to  occur in the first  place.  In a sense, countries  that  target  their  exchange
rates (against  an anchor currency) attempt  to "borrow" the foreign country's
monetary  policy credibility.
However, the  experience  of recent  years  has  shown  that  in  a  world  of
high capital  mobility and  unstable  capital  movements,  conventional  pegged
exchange rates have proved fragile (see Agenor and Montiel (1999)). Most im-
portantly,  simply pegging the exchange rate  did not prove to be a substitute
for maintaining  monetary  stability  and  credibility  at  home.  In fact,  recent
experiences  suggest that  exchange  rate  pegs can be  sustainable  only  when
they are credible, and  credibility is to a large extent  determined  by domestic
macroeconomic policies. FRom  that  perspective, an inflation targeting  regime
may operate  better  than  an exchange rate  targeting  framework. It  may even
be argued that,  to the extent  that  the domestic  currency  in many develop-
ing countries  has  been  attacked  because  the  central  bank  had  an  implicit
or explicit  exchange  rate  objective  that  was not  perceived  to  be  credible,
the adoption  of inflation targeting  may lead to a more stable  currency  if it
signals a clear commitment  to macroeconomic stability  and  a freely-floating
exchange rate.
It  is worth  emphasizing  that  a  key characteristic  of inflation  targeting
regimes compared  to other approaches to controlling inflation is that  the ad-
justment  of policy instruments  relies on a  systematic  assessment  of future
(rather  than  past  or current)  inflation, as opposed to  an  arbitrary  forecast.
Under this  regime, the central bank  must explicitly quantify an inflation tar-
get and establish precise mechanisms to achieve this target.  This implies that
there  is an  important  operational difference between  an  inflation  targeting
regime, on the one hand,  and monetary  and exchange rate  targeting,  on the
other.20 Changes  in monetary  policy instruments  usually  affect the  money
20Note also that  there  is an  important  difference between  exchange  rate  targeting  and
monetary  targeting,  in  the  sense that  while  it  is possible  to  deviate  temporarily  from
monetary  targets  if the  underlying  relationships  appear  to  have  changed,  it  is generally
not  possible to depart  temporarily  from an  exchange rate  peg  (or a target  band,  for that
matter)  without  there  being  a loss of credibility  and  possibly  a currency  crisis.
21supply and the exchange rate  faster than  inflation itself; as discussed earlier,
this leads to the existence of a control lag and a reaction function that  relates
the  policy instrument  to an  inflation  forecast.  The  implication,  as pointed
out by Haldane  (1998), is that  the credibility of an inflation targeting  regime
depends  not  on achieving a publicly-observable,  intermediate  target  that  is
viewed as a leading  indicator  of future  inflation  (as is the case under  mone-
tary or exchange rate targeting),  but  rather  on the credibility of a promise to
reach the inflation target  in the future.  This  in turn  depends  on whether  the
public believes that  the central  bank will stick resolutely  to  the objective  of
price stability.  Credibility  and  reputation  of the  monetary  authorities  may
play therefore an even more crucial role in dampening  inflation expectations
under  inflation targeting.  At the same time,  because performance  can only
be observed  ex post, the need for transparency  and  accountability  becomes
more acute  under  inflation  targeting,  in order  to  help the public  assess the
stance of monetary  policy and  determine  whether deviations  from target  are
due to  unpredictable  shocks rather  than  policy mistakes.
4  Basic  Requirements  for  Inflation  Tirgeting
There  are three  basic requirements  for implementing  an  inflation  targeting
regime.  The first is a high degree of central bank  independence  (not so much
in choosing the inflation target  itself but  rather  in the choice and  manipula-
tion of policy instruments),  the second is the absence of a  de facto  targeting
of the nominal  exchange  rate  (or, equivalently,  the predominance  of the  in-
flation target),  and the third  is increased  transparency  and  accountability.
4.1  Central  Bank  Independence  and  Credibility
Inflation  targeting  requires that  the central bank be endowed by the political
authorities  with a clear mandate  to pursue the objective of price stability  and
most importantly  a large degree of independence  in the  conduct of monetary
policy-namely,  in choosing the instruments  necessary to achieve the target
rate  of inflation. 21 This  implies, in  particular,  the  ability  to  resist  political
21Several countries  (such  as Israel  and the United  Kingdom)  have  followed  a contractual
approach  to inflation  targeting;  the government  sets an inflation  target in a contract  with
the central bank, and gives the central bank operational  independence  so that it can
manipulate  its policy  instruments  to achieve  the agreed  target.
22pressures  to  stimulate  the  economy in  the  short  term  and  the  absence of
"fiscal dominance,"  that  is, a situation  in which fiscal policy considerations
play an overwhelming role in monetary  policy decisions.  In countries  where
systematic  reliance on seigniorage as a source of revenue is high (a situation
quite  common  in  some  developing  countries  where  government  borrowing
from  the central  bank  is large) such  requirements  are difficult to  satisfy. 22
In such conditions, fiscally-induced inflationary pressures will undermine  the
effectiveness of monetary  policy by forcing, for instance,  the  central bank to
maintain  low interest  rates  in  an  attempt  to  prevent  unsustainable  public
debt  dynamics.  Alternatively,  as discussed  by Beddies  (1999),  the  central
bank  can be  forced by the  government  to  adopt  an inflation  target  that  is
dictated  by seigniorage requirements  as opposed to  price stability.23
Inflation  targeting  calls not only for a high  degree of central  bank  inde-
pendence,  but  also for  a sufficient degree  of credibility-or  more  properly
(following Drazen  and  Masson  (1994) and  Agenor and  Masson  (1999))  an
adequate  anti-inflation  reputation.  Independence,  credibility  and  reputation
are of course related but  may evolve differently over a  given period of time.
In countries where the financial system  is perceived to  be highly vulnerable
(to,  say, exchange rate  shocks, as discussed below)  and  the  central  bank  is
perceived to  be  likely to  inject  liquidity  to  prevent  a  full-blown crisis,  the
credibility  of an  announced  inflation  may be seriously  undermined-even  if
the  central  bank  is deemed  independent.  Lack of confidence in the  policy-
makers'  commitment  to (or ability  to maintain)  low inflation may be  one of
the  reasons  why inflation  tends  often to  display a  strong  degree of persis-
tence in developing countries,  as illustrated  by the auto-correlation  functions
for twelve developing countries  (with the exception of India,  Korea  and  the
Philippines)  displayed in Figure 3.24 But  establishing  credibility  or improv-
ing reputation,  particularly  in countries  with a history  of high inflation and
macroeconomic  instability,  is a  difficult process.  Analytically,  it has  been
22The ability of the central bank to conduct an independent monetary policy is also
hampered in some countries by severe  weaknesses  in the financial  system, which may force
the central bank to inject repeatedly large amounts of liquidity to support ailing banks.
23Note that, in practice, it has proved  difficult  to establish a close  and stable relationship
between fiscal deficits and inflation in developing  countries. As discussed by Agenor and
Montiel (1999),  this may have been the result of changes in deficit financing  rules or shifts
in expectations over time.
24f  course, inflation persistence may also be the result of backward-looking  inflation
expectations or overlapping  and asynchonized  wage and price contracts.
23shown  most notably  by Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997a)-that  inflation
targets  can  be  used  as  a way  of overcoming credibility  problems  because
they can mimic optimal  performance  incentive contracts;  and  by increasing
the  accountability  of monetary  policy, inflation targeting  may reduce the in-
flation  bias inherent  in discretionary  policy regimes. Moreover, as argued by
Walsh  (1999), the  public  announcement  of inflation  targets  may itself help
to improve the credibility of the central bank when its policy preferences  are
uncertain.
It  is important  to keep in mind, however, that  the link between inflation
performance  and  the degree of de jure  central  bank  independence  does not
appear  to  be  particularly  strong  in  developing  countries-at  least  for  the
1980s-as  illustrated  in Figure  4 for different measures of independence  and
as shown more formally in some recent research  (see for instance  Sikken and
De Haan  (1998), and De Haan  and Kooi (2000)).  What  matters,  in any case,
is  de facto  independence.  To the  extent  that,  for instance,  a lack of actual
autonomy  translates  into  uncertainty  about  the  central  bank's  preferences
over  output  and  inflation,  delegating  monetary  policy involves a  trade-off
between  credibility  and  stabilization  and  an  optimal  contract  can perform
better  than  an inflation target  (Beetsma  and  Jensen  (1998)).25
4.2  Absence  of de facto  Exchange  Rate  Targeting
Adopting  a low and stable  inflation rate  as the  main objective  of monetary
policy requires  in principle  the  absence of any commitment  to  a  particular
value  of the  exchange  rate,  as  is the  case under  a  floating  exchange  rate
regime.  In practice,  however, in many of the developing countries  that  have
opted  for a  de jure  flexible exchange rate,  monetary  authorities  have contin-
ued to  pay  considerable  attention  to  the value of the  domestic  currency-
often adopting  a de facto  target  path  or band.  There  are various reasons for
the  central  bank  to  be  concerned  with  nominal  exchange  rate  movements,
even when  its degree of independence  (and  thus  its  ability  to  commit itself
only to the pursuit  of price stability)  is high.  As noted earlier, the  exchange
rate  has a  direct  impact  on inflation  and  plays  a key  role in  transmitting
monetary  policy shocks to  prices.  If the  pass-through  effect is indeed high,
the central bank may be tempted  to intervene on the foreign exchange market
25However,  Muscatelli (1998, 1999) has argued that  neither inflation targeting nor an
optimal contract is likely to be superior to Rogoff-type  conservatism if central bank pref-
erences are uncertain.
24to limit currency fluctuations.  A high degree of nominal exchange rate insta-
bility may also be of concern to policymakers to the extent  that  it translates
into a high degree of variability  in the  real exchange rate  and  distorted  rel-
ative price signals to domestic  producers.  Another  important  reason is that
in  (partially)  dollarized  economies (like Peru  or  Turkey for instance)  large
fluctuations  in  exchange  rates  can lead  to  banking  and  financial  instabil-
ity by inducing large portfolio shifts between domestic- and foreign-currency
denominated  assets.  Finally, in countries  where the corporate  and  banking
sectors hold large foreign-currency liabilities, exchange rate depreciations  can
have significant adverse effects on their balance sheets.  This was, indeed, one
of the important  features  of the Asia crisis. 26
When  limiting  (or preventing)  exchange  rate  fluctuations  is a stated  or
an implicit policy target,  it will be usually very difficult for the central bank
to  convey to the  public its  intention  to  give priority  to  price  stability  over
other  objectives  of monetary  policy in  a credible and  transparent  manner.
Private  agents are likely to discount heavily public pronouncements;  and the
lack of credibility will translate  into higher inflation expectations.  Thus, the
absence  of  (implicit  or  explicit)  commitment  to  a  particular  level  for the
exchange rate-or,  equivalently, giving the inflation target  unambiguous pri-
ority over other policy objectives-is  an important  prerequisite  for adopting
inflation targeting.  In fact,  a credible commitment  to  an inflation targeting
regime in developing economies, by enhancing  macroeconomic and  financial
stability,  may well provide a greater  degree of stability  to a flexible nominal
exchange rate  than  a pegged arrangement  that  is subject  to  recurrent  spec-
ulative pressures  (and  possibly frequent crises and  forced devaluations)  due
to perceived inconsistencies in macroeconomic policy.
4.3  lransparency  and  Accountability
Openness and transparency  in the conduct of monetary  policy are important
ways to  improve  credibility  in  an  inflation  targeting  framework.  By  mak-
ing  the  central  bank  publicly  accountable  for its  decisions,  they  raise  the
incentive to  achieve the inflation  target  and  enhance  therefore  the  public's
confidence in the ability of the monetary  authorities  to do so. And by expos-
26See, for instance, Alba et  al.  (1999). It  should be noted, however, that  these last
two points can also be viewed as calling for adequate regulation and supervision of the
domestic banking system, not necessarily as arguments in favor of a rejection of inflation
targeting as a policy regime.
25ing to public  scrutiny  the process through  which monetary  policy  decisions
are taken,  they  may lead to  improved decision-making  by the  central  bank
and  enhanced  credibility  (see Briault,  Haldane  and  King (1997)).  The fact,
for instance,  that  monetary  authorities  must  announce  policy  changes and
explain the reason for these changes to the public may increase the effective-
ness of monetary  policy under  inflation targeting.  By reducing  uncertainty
about  the central  bank's  preferences,  transparency  may lead to  a lower ex-
pected  rate  of inflation and  a lower propensity  to  respond  to  supply shocks
(see Eijffinger, Hoeberichts,  and Schaling (2000)).27
For  instance,  Faust  and  Svensson  (1998) examined  the  role  of  trans-
parency in a model similar  to the one developed by Cukierman  and  Meltzer
(1986).  The central  bank  in  the  model is tempted  to  deviate  from an  an-
nounced  inflation  target  due  to  fluctuations  in an  idiosyncratic  component
of  its  employment  target.  The  employment  target  is private  information
to  the  central  bank  and  unobservable  to  the  public.  Private  agents,  nev-
ertheless,  observe macroeconomic outcomes  (contemporaneous  inflation and
employment)  and  imperfectly  infer the  central  bank's  employment  target.
This inference process affects the central bank's  perceived reputation  by the
public,  which  in turn  affects private  inflation expectations.  In this  setting,
increased transparency  allows the public to infer the bank's  employment  tar-
get  with  greater  precision,  thereby  rendering  the  central  bank's  reputation
and  the  private-sector  inflation  expectations  more sensitive  to  its  actions.
This,  in turn,  increases the  cost  for the  central  bank  of deviating  from the
announced  inflation  target  and  pursuing  its  idiosyncratic  employment  tar-
get.  Consequently, increased  transparency  induces the  central bank  to  stick
more closely to  the  announced  policy.  It  provides  an  implicit  commitment
mechanism  that  reduces the temptation  by the  monetary  authorities  to  act
in a discretionary  fashion and  deviate from the announced  policy.
A potential  problem with  accountability  in an  inflation targeting  frame-
work is related  to  the difficulty of assessing performance  only on  the  basis
of inflation outcomes.  The reason is that  (as indicated  earlier) there  is a lag
between policy actions  and their  impact  on the economy; it is thus  possible
(or tempting)  for the  central  bank  to  blame  "unforeseen"  or totally  unpre-
dictable  events for inadequate  performance,  instead  of taking  responsibility
for policy  mistakes.  To mitigate  this  risk,  in  inflation-targeting  countries
27This, of course, assumes that the public is familiar with the inflation target  and the
specific  price index upon which the target is based; see the discussion  below.
26the central bank is required usually to justify its policy decisions and explain
publicly differences between actual outcomes and inflation targets.28 In what
is arguably the strongest  case of accountability  of a central bank in inflation-
targeting  countries, the government  in New Zealand can dismiss the central
bank governor if the inflation target  is breached, even temporarily  (see Archer
(2000)). In practice,  openness and  transparency  have been promoted  by the
regular publication  of an Inflation  Report, which sets out  the central  bank's
analysis of recent economic developments, and a forecast of inflation (as well
as other  variables,  including  output)  over the  coming year or years.  In the
words of Archer  (2000, p.  16):
It is harder for the central bank to "cheat" on its mandate when it is forced
to lay out an internally consistent basis for the decisions  to be made. To be
sure, a good publicist can make almost any position sound reasonable, but
when  it matters financial  markets seem  to have good noses for spin-doctoring.
Accountability  has been promoted  by providing public  explanations  (in
the form of a public letter  from the governor of the central bank  to the gov-
ernment)  of the reason(s)  why the  rate of inflation deviated  from the target
by more than  a given percentage on either side, how long these deviations  are
expected to persist,  and what policies the central bank intends to implement
to bring  inflation back to target.
5  The  Operational  Framework  of Inflation  Tar-
geting
Establishing  an operational  framework for implementing  an inflation target-
ing regime requires monetary  authorities  to  take various steps.  They must,
in particular,  specify a price index to  target  and  quantify  the  target.  They
must  also  determine  under  what  circumstances  escape  clauses  or  exemp-
tions to the inflation target  are warranted  (taking into account  the potential
credibility  loss that  their  discretionary  nature  may  involve),  decide  ways
through  which they can convince the public that  achieving the inflation tar-
get takes precedence over all other objectives of monetary  policy and devising
a forward-looking operating  procedure in which monetary  policy instruments
28The distinction between goal independence and instrument independence, alluded to
earlier, implies that  the latter is essential for accountability of the monetary authorities.
27are adjusted  (in line with  the assessment  of future  inflation)  to  achieve the
target.  This  section  reviews these various  requirements,  with  a  particular
emphasis on their  implications  for developing countries.
5.1  Establishing  Inflation  Targets
Establishing  inflation targets  requires the central bank, in particular,  to spec-
ify an  index to  target,  set  a  level for the  target,  and  establish  an  explicit
quantitative  target  for inflation  for some periods  ahead-a  process  that  re-
quires deciding whether to set the target  as a point or as a band (for instance,
between 2 and 4 percent)  or as a point,  and choosing the number of quarters
or years  over which the  target  will be  averaged.  They  must  also set  up  a
model or methodology  for inflation forecasting that  uses indicators  contain-
ing information  on future  inflation.
5.1.1  The  choice  of  a price  index
How  to  measure  inflation  is  naturally  a  key  issue in  the  context  of infla-
tion  targeting.  A first  question  to  ponder  in  this  context  is whether  the
price index chosen should reflect the prices of goods and services for current
consumption  only, or prices relevant  for both  current  and  future  consump-
tion.  Economic theory  suggests  that  a  correct  measure  of inflation  is  an
index that  captures  prices of both  present  and  future consumption,  because
only  such  an  index can  recognize the  scope for intertemporal  substitution
in  consumption  (Alchian and  Klein  (1973)).  In practice,  however, price  in-
dices do  not  include  prices of  present  claims  over  goods  and  services  for
future  consumption-except  indirectly  when they  incorporate  prices of ser-
vices provided  by consumer  durables  that  can be  acquired  today.  In most
cases,  markets  for future  goods and  services do not  exist,  and  producing  a
comprehensive price index as theory would suggest is simply not feasible. 29
A second question that  must be considered is related  to the fact that  con-
sumer price indices typically found in developing countries are not  adequate
measures of the cost of living, despite several advantages  (general acceptance
291n addition,  using asset  prices  (which can be  viewed as reflecting  the  current  money
prices of claims on future consumption)  is fraught  with practical  difficulties.  Note, however,
that  excluding  asset  prices  from  the  price  index  used  for  inflation  targeting  does  not
necessarily  preclude  the  possibility  of taking  these prices into  account  in the  formulation
of monetary  policy; see the  discussion below.
28among the public, availability on a monthly  basis, publication  without  long
delays, and infrequent  data  revisions, unlike, say, GDP  deflators).  In almost
all of these countries,  consumer price indices are typically fixed-weight aver-
ages of prices of a  "basket"  of goods and  services.  Price data  are gathered
by statistical  agencies through  regular  visits  to  specified sales outlets.  The
weights are based  on the  distribution  by product  of consumer  expenditure
and are revised at regular intervals as the composition  of household expendi-
ture changes. These indices are not designed to measure the effect of changes
in the types,  amounts  and quality  of the goods and  services households pur-
chase.  Specifically, in measuring  inflation, existing price  indices suffer from
three  main  sources of bias,  whose relative  importance  is of course likely to
vary across countries:
* Substitution  bias, which arises because  consumers  can be expected  to
switch expenditure  away from more expensive products  toward  cheaper
products,  and  away from more expensive stores  toward  cheaper  ones.
Regular  reviews  of the  weights  in  the  index  and  of the  selection  of
outlets  chosen for sampling purposes helps to reduce substitution  bias,
but  the bias is likely to persist  in the periods between  these reviews.
*  Quality  bias, which  arises  because  the  quality  of goods  and  services
within  a particular  category  may change,  but  the  change may not  be
fully reflected  in computing  the  price index.  If quality  increases over
time  (as tends to be the case for many products),  failure to account for
it fully will lead to overstatement  of inflation.
* New products bias, which stems from the fact that  new goods are con-
tinually  introduced  whereas  existing ones are continuously  witdrawn.
To the extent  that  new products  widen choice opportunities  for house-
holds  and  allow them  to  achieve a given level of utility  at  a cost  that
may be lower than  previously, failure to  account  for them  will lead to
an overestimate  of inflation.
These sources of bias can be  quite  significant in practice.  For instance,
the Boskin Report  (see Boskin et  al.  (1996)) estimated  that,  in the  United
States,  substitution  bias  (including  outlet  substitution  bias)  was about  0.5
percent  a year in terms  of CPI  inflation whereas  quality  and  new products
bias represented  about  0.6 percent  per annum  in  1995-96. In general,  how-
ever, accounting for bias  can be very difficult. One reason  is that  estimates
29of bias tend  to  be very unreliable;  another  is that  the  intensity  of bias may
vary significantly  over time. 30 Inflation  targets  are thus  generally  set with
some degree of arbitrariness  on the  basis  of price indexes that  suffer from
potentially  significant  measurement  problems.  In addition,  particularly  in
developing countries,  there is a considerable amount  of transitory  noise that
makes the measurement  of inflation difficult. In many of these countries  (as
in most industrial  countries),  the consumer price index is a Laspeyres index,
that  is, an  arithmetic  mean of the relative  prices of the  goods and  services
contained  in a representative  basket of goods, this  mean being weighted  ac-
cording to  expenditure  shares  in a base period.3"  The annual  inflation rate
is thus  measured as the weighted average of the rates  of change for individ-
ual prices.  Thus,  if the price of a particular  component  is subject  to  large
short-term  movements,  then  the measured  rate  of overall inflation will also
reflect the corresponding  movements-to  an extent  that  reflects the relative
weight of that  component  in  the  consumption  basket.  In countries  where
domestic  food prices  (which can be  highly volatile)  are  a large  component
of the consumption  basket, such problems can be significant.  Figure  5 illus-
trates  the high correlation  between variability  in food prices and  variability
in  consumer  prices in  developing  countries.  Shocks to  the  exchange  rate,
wages, controlled prices and external  inflation that  affect price developments
can also be beyond  the control  of monetary  authorities.
To alleviate the problem of noisy or erratic short-run  movements in prices,
inflation-targeting  central banks  have often used a measure  of core (or long-
terrn)  inflation  as their  policy target.32 Such measures  are generally calcu-
30See Gordon  (1999,  p.  17), who suggested  that estimates  of inflation  bias published
in the Boskin  Report (of which  he was a co-author)  were probably  understated,  in part
because  the sharp declines  in the prices  of new products were not fully accounted  for.
Cellular  phones,  for instance,  appeared  in 1985  in the United  States  as a consumer  product
but was  introduced  in the CPI only in 1998-by which  time there were  already  55 million
subscribers  to cellular  phone  services  in the country.  Between  1985  and 1997,  the price of
these services  dropped  dramatically.
31Formally,  if p' denotes the price of good iat  period t  (i  =  1,...n), qt the quan-
tity of good i purchased  at period t, the Laspeyres  price index between  periods tand
t±+  1 isP~t/t+ 1 =  1pt+1qt  /i=lptqt.  This index tends to overstate  inflation,  be-
cause it assumes  no substitution  in consumption  expenditures  in response  to changes
in relative  prices. By contrast, a current-weighted  Paasche  index, defined  as P  =
t/t+1
Ei= 1Pt+lq+ 1 / Eni=lptqt+ 1 , uses  current  quantities  as  weights  and  thus  tends  to  over-
state substitution  and to understate  inflation.
32See  Roger  (1998)  and Wynne  (1999)  for recent  reviews  of the literature  on core  infla-
30lated  by removing some components  of the  price indexes, particularly  those
that  appear  to be substantially  more volatile than  prices of other  goods and
services. The  argument  is that  short-term  movements  in these prices result
from rapid  adjustment  to  frequent  real shocks that  are often  reversed, and
so they contain  substantially  less information  about  the  long-term  trend  in
inflation.  By choosing an adjusted  price index, instead  of the general  index
of consumer prices,  central  banks  may thus  avoid unnecessary  fluctuations
in interest  rates,  employment  and output.
In  general,  there  are  three  types  of price  disturbances  that  inflation-
targeting  central  banks  have attempted  to  remove, the  first  two being par-
ticularly  relevant for developing countries:
*  Disturbances  associated  with  temporary  changes in  the  rate  of infla-
tion.  Examples  are movements in highly volatile, but  over time offset-
ting,  CPI components  (such as food and  energy prices),  shocks to  the
exchange  rate,  and  changes in  indirect  taxes  or regulated  prices that
lead to jumps  in the price level, without  sustained,  longer-term  effects
on the inflation rate.
o  Shocks to inflation with possibly long-lasting effects, but  where a strong
monetary  response  would produce  very large  fluctuations  in  the  real
economy. Examples include large changes in prices of imported  inputs
or natural  disasters.
. Disturbances  associated  with  the  direct  effects of  policy  changes on
inflation,  in cases where the targeted  price index contains  components
(such as mortgage payments)  that  vary directly with the level of short-
term  interest  rates.  The reason is that  a tightening  in monetary  policy
may translate  into a spurious rise in inflation.
The identification  of these various types of disturbances  makes it possible
to  distinguish,  as proposed  by some economists,  between  core inflation  (as
defined above),  cyclical inflation (due for instance  to food prices),  and  tran-
sitory  inflation (price increases generated by specific shocks, such as changes
in indirect  taxes and imported  energy prices, or shocks to the exchange rate
and controlled prices).
In practice,  there  are several techniques  for calculating  core inflation (see
Wynne (1999)).  One method,  used by the Bank of Canada,  consists of using
tion.
31weights that  are linked to the relative price variability of individual goods and
services in the consumption basket; each expenditure  weight is divided by the
standard  deviation  of its  relative  price change  (calculated  as the  difference
between the inflation rate  of the sub-component  and the  overall index) and
they  are  all renormalized  (using  a  single- or  double-weighted  method)  to
ensure  that  they  add  up to unity.  The  higher the standard  deviation  (that
is, the higher the volatility)  of any given component,  the lower its  adjusted
weight.  In this  way, all components  are kept in the basket  but  the effect of
the more volatile ones on the overall index is reduced.
Nevertheless,  the  practical  difficulties involved in  the  calculation  of ad-
justed  measures of underlying inflation should not  be under-estimated.33 In
particular,  truly  temporary  shocks are  rare  in  practice  and  characterizing
them  as such can be the result of an incorrect  assessment of general equilib-
rium effects.  Consider,  for instance,  a rise  in indirect  taxes that  lowers the
rate  of inflation during  a limited period of time,  after which inflation returns
to  its previous  level. Such changes in taxes will generally also affect the rest
of the economy; they may reduce aggregate  demand  and  production,  which
could have an  additional  downward effect  on inflation  in  the  longer term.
They  may also alter  inflation expectations  or wage settlements  and  thereby
price-setting  decisions. These  "second-round" effects may be protracted  and
must be taken into consideration when establishing  an inflation forecast.  The
result may be that  the proper response to an increase in indirect  taxes is not
only to refrain from increasing interest  rates, but indeed to lower them,  if the
inflation forecast  has  fallen below target.  A similar  argument  can be  made
in relation to temporary  energy price shocks. Mechanically excluding certain
components  of the  consumer  price index from  the  policy reaction  function
can translate  into a loss of potentially  important  information regarding future
inflation developments.
It is also worth noting that  there is a potential  for conflict or uncertainty
resulting  from differences in  price  movements  between  inflation  in  the  to-
tal  CPI  and  adjusted  inflation.  If the  target  is not  easy  for the  public  to
understand  and follow, these differences can create credibility problems,  par-
ticularly  in countries with  a history  of high  inflation and  lack of reputation
of the  central  bank  (see the  discussion below of the  Brazilian  experience).
33In particular, it should be noted that there remains some disagreement  in the literature
regarding the very definition of core inflation. Quah and Vahey (1995),  for instance, define
core inflation as the component of inflation that  does not affect real output in the long
run. They propose a structural VAR approach to calculate it.
32In  such conditions,  a  headline  inflation target,  being  more familiar  to  the
public, would make monetary  policy more transparent-even  if it is subject
to some defects in measuring underlying  price pressures.
5.1.2  Width  of the  target  band
Many inflation-targeting  countries have chosen to specify their  inflation tar-
get  in the  form  of a band  (sometimes  around  a  central  value)  rather  than
a single point  target.  A key reason for doing so is the  recognition  that,  be-
cause economic behavior  and outcomes  are not  completely  predictable,  it is
difficult to  hit continuously  a single point target  for inflation.  Trying to  do
so could cause interest  rates  to be excessively volatile  and  could destabilize
financial markets.  By recognizing uncertainty,  a target  band for inflation can
stabilize  price expectations.  At the same time,  a band  introduces  some de-
gree of flexibility in the conduct of monetary  policy. It gives the central bank
some discretion over which point in the band  it aims for in taking  its policy
decisions and  allows it to accommodate  transitory  shocks to  inflation-and
this  ability can provide a partial  substitute  for targeting  a core inflation rate
(Orphanides  and Wieland  (2000, p.  1383)). This  flexibility is important  not
only  to  stabilize  output  fluctuations  but  also to  accommodate  movements
in the nominal  exchange rate.  A large depreciation,  for instance,  because it
puts upward pressure on domestic prices (as discussed earlier)  would require
a rise in policy interest  rates  that  may be sizable with  a point  target.  But
the depreciation  may weaken corporate  balance sheets if firms are highly in-
debted in foreign currency and push them into bankruptcy;  the rise in interest
rates would only exacerbate  the problem.  On the contrary,  with a sufficiently
wide band,  the  inflationary  impact  of exchange rate  market  pressures  could
be  accommodated  (at  least  to  some extent)  without  large  and  potentially
destabilizing  policy changes.
The foregoing discussion suggests that  the width  of the  band  should de-
pend  on the  variability  of the  rate  of inflation  (which itself depends  on the
nature,  size and  variability  of underlying  shocks to  prices and  changes in
behavioral patterns),  the policy horizon (the further  ahead  the horizon, the
more difficult it is to  forecast inflation  and  predict  the  effects of monetary
policy actions),  as well as the degree of discretion that  the central bank main-
tains  in the  conduct  of monetary  policy.  FRom the latter  perspective,  there
is obviously a trade-off between credibility  and flexibility in the choice of the
optimal target  band:  the wider the bands  are, the more likely it is that  the
33target  will be achieved but  the less credible the target  will be.34
Another  issue  is whether  the  band  should  be  asymmetric  or  not.  In
practice,  inflation-targeting  countries have tended  to adopt  symmetric bands
upon  announcement  of a  central  target.  The  "signal"  that  central  banks
have attempted  to  convey in doing so is that  they  view deflation  as  being
as costly as inflation.  There  are cases, however, where  asymmetry  may be
desirable.  If, for instance,  the  central bank  believes that  the credibility  loss
associated  with  overshooting the  target  is higher than  the  loss incurred  by
undershooting  it, an asymmetric band may provide a somewhat higher degree
of flexibility. 35
5.1.3  Horizon  of the  inflation  target
As discussed earlier, because inflation is subject to unpredictable  shocks and
monetary  policy operates  with  a lag, inflation-targeting  central  banks  can-
not  achieve continuously  their  target.  At  what  time  horizon,  then,  should
monetary  policy aim to achieve the inflation target?
Suppose, for instance,  that  the  inflation forecast indicates  that  with  un-
changed interest  rates  inflation will rise above target  in the first year of the
forecast period  and  fall below target  in later  years.  If interest  rate  changes
implemented  today  affect inflation only  after  a lag of (say) two years,  then
it is too late  to  prevent  a rise in inflation above target  in the  first year and
interest  rates  should  be  lowered so as to  bring  inflation in  the  second year
and  beyond  up to  target.  But  suppose now that  the  control  lag is only  six
months.  Increasing interest  rates today may therefore allow the central bank
to  bring inflation  down toward  target  in the second half of the  first year of
the forecast.  At the same time,  however, the increase in interest  rates  today
is likely to reduce inflation even further  below the forecast at  the beginning
of the second year; and  if the lag between policy actions  and  their  effect on
inflation are distributed  over a period of time, rather  than being concentrated
at a particular  lag length,  inflation will remain below forecast for at least part
of the second year.  The central bank  has to use interest  rates to manage  the
34In some sense,  the choice  of an optimal  inflation  target band is reminiscent  of the
problem  of choosing  the optimal  width of an exchange  rate target zone,  as discussed  for
instance  by Cukierman,  Kiguel,  and Leiderman  (1994). See, however,  Orphanides  and
Wieland  (2000)  for a different  perspective.
35As discussed  later, asymmetric  policy  preferences  may also lead to an asymmetric
optimal  instrument  rule, regardless  of whether  a formal  band is in place or not.
34path  of inflation  relative  to  the  inflation target,  starting  from the  point  in
the  future  at  which  monetary  policy decisions taken  today  start  affecting
inflation.  Thus,  as noted earlier, the  target  horizon cannot  be shorter  than
the control  horizon.
At the same time,  the central  bank needs to take into account  the trade-
off that  may arise between  reducing deviations  of inflation  from target  and
preventing  a  high  degree of variability  of output.  Suppose  that  there  has
been an  adverse supply shock which causes inflation to  increase  above tar-
get.  How quickly  should  the  central  bank  aim  to  bring  inflation  back to
target?  As  discussed  earlier,  there  are  two conflicting  considerations  (see
Figure  2).  On  the  one  hand,  the  quicker the  disinflation,  the  shorter  the
period during  which inflation  is above target;  on the other,  the  quicker the
disinflation,  the greater  the  potential  fluctuations  in  output.  The  optimal
length of the target  horizon depends  therefore  also on policy preferences, in
addition  to the magnitude  of the  shocks affecting inflation.  The greater  the
relative importance  attached  to output  stabilization  relative to inflation sta-
bilization,  the longer the optimal  length. 36 In addition,  however, if there  is
an inflationary  bias, a longer targeting  horizon will hamper  the credibility  of
monetary  policy, because  agents will understand  the central  bank's  greater
temptation  to  inflate  and  create  surprise  inflation.  FRom that  perspective,
there  is also a trade-off between credibility  and flexibility (Garfinkel and  Oh
(1993)).  Whether  or not  a finite-period  targeting  procedure  is desirable  de-
pends  then  on the cost  of limiting flexibility so as to  reduce the  severity of
the credibility  problem.
5.1.4  Forecasting  procedure
Inflation  targeting  requires  the  monetary  authorities  to  have the  technical
and  institutional  capacity  to  model  and  forecast  inflation,  understand  the
monetary  transmission  mechanism,  and  estimate  the  time  lag between  the
adjustment  of monetary  instruments  and  their  effect on output  and  prices.
This, in turn,  implies greater  reliance on forward indicators  of inflation than
in other  monetary  policy regimes and  a  continuous  assessment  of the  rela-
tionship between the instruments  of monetary  policy and the inflation target.
3 6 fSee Batini and Haldane (1999) and Isard and Laxton (2000) for recent quantitative
research on policy  tradeoffs of this type. Note also that, in practice, stabilizing movements
in output can also be achieved  by a temporary widening of the target band, if there is one
in place.
35Establishing  an accurate  forecast of inflation and  a relatively  precise es-
timate  of how inflation is likely to be affected by changes in monetary  policy
instruments  is not an easy task when the structure  of the economy is unstable
and  behavioral  relationships  unreliable. 37 Moreover, the  higher the  level of
inflation, the more volatile the inflation rate tends  to be (as shown in Figure
6) and  thus  the more difficult it is to  predict  accurately  future  price devel-
opments.  In such conditions, setting  point targets  may actually  damage the
central  bank's  credibility.  In practice,  inflation-targeting  central  banks  have
used both  economic models  (generally small in size) and  qualitative  judge-
ment  regarding  how economic behavior and  relationships  are likely to  differ
in the future from what  has been observed in the past.  Moreover, they have
increasingly recognized in their inflation reports  the uncertainty  surrounding
economic forecasts,  that  is, the fact  that  forecasts embody  probability  dis-
tributions  of future  values of economic variables.  The Bank  of England  for
instance,  and many other central banks in its wake-including  those of Brazil,
Chile, and  Sweden-have  used a  "fan chart"  to  present  their  forecasts  (see,
for instance,  Blix and  Sellin (1998)).  By de-emphasizing,  or even not  pro-
viding, point forecasts, the inherent  uncertainties  associated  with forecasting
can be communicated  to the public.
It  should be noted, however, that  releasing an inflation forecast does not
necessarily enhance the transparency  of the decision process of monetary  pol-
icy; repeated  forecasting  errors  can eventually  reduce  the  credibility  of the
central  bank  by raising doubts  about  its  ability  to assess the  future  behav-
ior  of prices. 38 Another  issue relates  to  how best  to  establish  and  release
forecasts  to  the  public.  Many  inflation-targeting  central  banks-with  the
exception  of the  Bank  of England,  which recently  began releasing  inflation
projections  based  on  market  expectations  of future  interest  rates-publish
forecasts based on the assumption  that  policy interest  rates will remain  con-
stant  over the projection  horizon.  To the extent  that  the  predicted  path  for
inflation is too  high relative to  target,  this gives a signal that  interest  rates
will be raised in the near future-which  may influence economic conditions,
371n  many developing countries, administered or controlled prices are  an important
component of aggregate price indices and thus important factors in the short-run behavior
of inflation.  A proper inflation forecasting procedure needs also to incorporate explicit
assumptions about the timing and magnitude of changes in these prices.
38Releasing  inflation forecasts can also be problematic if they have an undesirable effect
on mominal wages, for instance by becoming a floor for centralized wage negotiations.
36potentially  making the  forecasts internally  inconsistent. 39 Moreover, basing
the inflation forecast on endogenous monetary  policy responses would make
the  forecast  itself  irrelevant,  because  it  would always be  on  target  at  the
horizon over which the central bank acts to  achieve its goals.  Public interest
would therefore shift to the implied sequence of policy rates embedded  in the
forecasts.  However, central  banks  may not  be willing to  release projections
of future  short-term  interest  rates,  because this  may run  the  risk that  any
deviation  of policy rates  from the  forecast level (even if caused by new in-
formation)  could be perceived as inconsistent  behavior  by the central  bank
and  harm  its  credibility.  Finally,  information  regarding  the  expected  path
of interest  rates  is not  necessarily  useful to  the public  unless it  is specified
how short-term  interest  rates  are determined  in the first  place.  Knowledge
of the  central  bank's  policy reaction  function  is essential  to  determnine the
implications  of new information  for the setting  of policy instruments.
5.2  Interest  Rates  Rules  in Practice
As shown earlier, under  "strict"  inflation forecast  targeting  the optimal  rule
is to  set the  interest  rate  so as to  bring  expected  inflation  in line with  the
inflation target  at the control horizon.  By contrast,  under  "flexible" inflation
forecast targeting,  the optimal rule is to close less than  fully any gap between
expected  inflation  and  the  inflation target.  In practice,  however,  inflation-
targeting  central banks have tended to use simple feedback interest  rate  rules
rather  than complicated,  optimal targeting  rules.  Simple feedback rules have
some clear  advantages.  First,  they  tend  to  be  more robust  when  there  is
uncertainty  about  the  true  structure  of the  economy;  second,  the  may  be
advantageous  on monitorability  and  credibility  grounds.  This  is important
in the  context  of inflation targeting.  However, simple rules  are also subject
to  one  major  weakness: they  tend  to  use information  (notably  about  the
economy's structure)  less efficiently than  an optimal  rule.
Two additional  issues to consider in this context  are, first, whether simple
rules display evidence of "flexible" inflation targeting;  and,  second, whether
they  embed  forward-looking components.  Regarding  the  first  issue,  some
recent  research  has indeed attempted  to  determine  whether  the  behavior of
inflation-targeting  central banks can be characterized  as  "strict"  or 'flexible"
39Market observers may also wonder why the  "future" tightening implied by publishing
a forecast that  shows inflation moving above target has not been implemented yet-and
this may hurt the central bank's credibility.
37inflation targeting.  This  has  been  done  in  some cases  by testing  whether
the output  gap enters  significantly in an empirically-estimated  interest  rate
rule.  Leiderman  and  Bar-Or  (2000), for instance,  estimated  the  policy reac-
tion function of the Central  Bank of Israel using monthly data  for the period
1994-99 and found that  interest  rates  are positively  related  to  current  infla-
tion, lagged changes in output,  and the previous period's  interest  rate.  It is
important  to note, however, that  the fact that  there is a significant coefficient
attached  to output  in an estimated  interest  rate  reaction  function  does not
necessarily  imply that  in  practice  monetary  policy is guided in  part  by an
output  stabilization  objective.  To the  extent  that  current  inflation  is only
an imperfect proxy for future inflation, and to the extent  that  the latter  does
depend on the level of economic activity,  it is possible for output  to  appear
in the reaction  function with  a significant coefficient-without,  by itself be-
ing indicative  of a departure  from "strict"  inflation targeting.  Indeed, in the
derivation of the optimal interest  rate  rule in Svensson's model given above,
it was shown that  even when the  output  gap does not  enter  the  policy loss
function  (A =  0), it will (together  with current  inflation)  affect the value of
the instrument;  the reason is that  both variables help predict future  inflation.
The  second  issue  relates  to  the  role of forward-looking  components  in
actual policy reaction  functions.  This  is important  because simple forecast-
based  rules  have some  clear  similarities  with  the  type  of optimal  flexible
inflation-forecast targeting  rules derived earlier; monetary  policy under  both
types of rules  seeks to  offset deviations  between  expected  inflation  and  the
inflation target  at some horizon. 40 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand's  pol-
icy projections,  for instance,  are based  on an  explicit,  forward-looking  pol-
icy reaction  function  that  takes  a  relatively  simple  form  (Archer  (2000)).
Some econometric  studies  (see  Clarida,  Gall  and  Gertler  (1998a,  1998b))
have shown that  a reaction function that  includes a forward-looking measure
of inflation,  the  contemporaneous  output  gap, and  lagged interest  rates  (to
account  for smoothing  considerations)  characterizes  monetary  policy fairly
well for the  United  States,  Japan  and  Germany.  The  kind  of policy  rule
that  underlies this  specification is what  Clarida,  Galf and  Gertler  call  "soft-
hearted"  inflation  targeting:  in response  to  a rise in expected  inflation  rel-
ative  to target,  the  central bank  raises nominal  interest  rates  sufficiently to
40Batini  and Haldane  (1999),  Isard and Laxton  (2000),  Parrado (1999),  and Rudebush
and Svensson  (1999),  have  analyzed  the dynamic  properties  of both simple  and optimal
forecast-based  rules using  simulation  techniques.
38push  up real rates,  but  there  is also a pure  stabilization  component  to each
rule.  Mehra (1999) also estimated  a policy reaction function  for the Federal
Reserve Board that  contains  both  backward- and forward-looking elements;
the  funds rate  is shown to depend on actual  inflation, increases in expected
future inflation, the expected output  gap, and the long-term  bond rate.  The
latter  variable, which captures  the effect of long-term  inflation expectations
on policy decisions, became particularly  important  after  1979, the beginning
of the Volcker-Greenspan era.
5.3  Asset  Prices  and  Inflation  Targeting
The role of asset  prices-stock  prices, house prices, and bond  yields-in  the
conduct of monetary  policy has been the subject  of renewed debate  in indus-
trial countries  (see Cecchetti,  Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani  (2000)). Part
of the  reason  is the  growing importance  of equities  in households'  financial
wealth, as documented for instance  by Boon, Giorno, and Richardson  (1998),
and the high degree of volatility exhibited  by stock prices in recent  years.  In
the specific context  of inflation targeting,  (unexpected)  movements  in asset
prices may affect the  central bank's  inflation forecast and  there  are at least
two reasons why that  should  be so (see Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1999),  and
Smets  (1997)).  First,  changes in asset  prices may have a direct  impact  on
aggregate demand.  For instance,  changes in stock  prices may affect private
consumption  expenditure  (through  their  impact  on wealth)  and  investment
spending-by  affecting the ability of firms to pledge collateral and raise funds.
Second, higher house prices may increase the ability of households to borrow
and spend,  whereas sharp  changes in exchange rates  may affect the demand
for foreign goods and the  ability of firms to sell domestic  goods abroad.
To the extent  that  movements in asset prices are not the result of changes
in underlying  fundamentals,  offsetting these changes through  adjustments  in
monetary  policy instruments  (essentially a  "lean against  the wind"  interest
rate  policy) may avoid costly fluctuations  in output  and prices.  Second, as-
set  prices are  strongly  influenced by expectations  of future  returns,  which
in turn  are related  to expectations  of future economic activity,  inflation and
monetary  policy. Thus,  even if their  impact on aggregate demand  is limited,
they may contain  useful information about  current and  future economic con-
ditions.  This  information  may be  used to  improve the  inflation forecast  on
which the direction  of monetary  policy is based.
However, the  information  contained  in asset  prices movements  may be
39limited  because  they  may reflect erratic  changes in expectations.  To what
extent  this  is actually  the  case may be  difficult to  gauge,  because  existing
asset price models are based on unobserved variables; their  empirical predic-
tions are subject  to wide margins of error.  This makes it difficult to  identify
the  "right"  price  (reflecting, say, future  profit growth  rates  or productivity
shocks) and therefore  what is an erratic  movement or speculative  bubble.  In
such conditions, incorporating  asset prices systematically  in monetary  policy
feedback rules may be  unwarranted  (see Fuhrer  and  Moore  (1992)).  More-
over, the  risk premium  that  is typically  embedded  in asset  prices tends  to
vary over time.  Basing  monetary  policy on a broader,  asset-based  measure
of prices or monetary  conditions  may actually  lead to  greater  variability  in
current  and  future  output  and inflation.
6  Recent  Experiences
As  noted  in  the  introduction,  in  recent  years  a  number  of industrial  and
developing  countries  have adopted  an  inflation  targeting  regime.  To  put
matters  in perspective,  consider the results of the survey of monetary  policy
frameworks conducted  in late  1998 by the Bank of England  and summarized
by Sterne (1999). 91 countries, of which 43 were considered developing coun-
tries, were covered. Almost all the central banks surveyed targeted  either  the
money supply, the  exchange  rate,  or inflation  directly.  Several of them  (in
both  industrial  and developing countries) stated  that  instability  in the veloc-
ity of money (induced in many cases by financial liberalization)  led them to
abandon  money targeting.  In  1998 there  were 54 countries  with  an  explicit
inflation target  (compared to 8 in 1990), 37 with  an explicit monetary  aggre-
gate target,  and  47 with  an explicit exchange rate  target.  Between 1990 and
1998, explicit  targets  (whether  for money, inflation,  or  the  exchange  rate)
became more widespread.  Of the 54 countries that  had  inflation targets,  13
(or 14 percent  of the sample) had inflation targets  only; thus, many countries
had several explicit targets.41 The majority of countries that  abandoned  their
exchange rate target  (including Mexico in 1995 and Russia in 1998) did so in
response to a currency  crisis.  The fastest  growing regime was the combined
use of explicit money and inflation targets  (24 percent  of the countries in the
4 "The  use of multiple explicit targets may reflect the  fact that,  in practice,  targets
are viewed more as benchmarks (against which outcomes are measured) by monetary
authorities as opposed to objectives  that  must be achieved.
40sample in 1998)-more  than the combined total  of inflation targets  only (14
percent)  and  money targets  only  (5 percent).  In a related  study,  Morande
and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1999) listed a total  of 45 countries that,  over the  1990s
adopted  some form of inflation target:  12 industrial  countries,  12 transition
economies  and  21 developing  countries.  They  also identified  34 countries
that  targeted  primarily  money and  36 that  targeted  primarily  the exchange
rate.  Although  there  is some scope for disagreement  with  the  classification
schemes used in these two studies, the broad message is quite clear: a growing
number of countries  have turned to  inflation targeting  as a monetary  policy
framework.
There is now a large literature  assessing country experiences with inflation
targeting,  particularly  in the industrial  world; among the most recent  publi-
cations are those of Bernanke,  Laubach,  Mishkin, and  Posen (1999), Blejer,
Ize, Leone, and Werlang (2000), Landerretche,  Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1999), and  Schaechter, Stone, and  Zelmer (2000). Accordingly, the  focus of
this section will be rather  brief and will focus on developing countries-most
notably  Brazil,  Thailand,  and South Africa.
6.1  Industrial  Countries
The  first country  to  introduce  inflation  targeting  was New Zealand  in late
1989.  Other  countries  to  follow suit  include  Canada  (February  1991), Is-
rael  (January  1991), the  United  Kingdom  (late  1992), Australia,  Finland,
and  Sweden (all in  1993), and  Spain  (January  1995).42 Adoption  of infla-
tion  targeting  followed either  from increased  instability  in  the  relationship
between  monetary  aggregates  and  prices,  or exchange  rate  crises.  In  the
United  Kingdom,  for instance,  inflation  targeting  was introduced  after  the
country  left  the  European  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  in  September  1992.
With  the  exception of Israel and Spain,  all countries implementing  inflation
targeting  did so in the context  of a highly flexible exchange rate  regime.  Is-
rael for instance  has  maintained  since 1991 a diagonal  exchange  rate  band;
the presence of this band has acted as a constraint  on the inflation objective,
42See Allen (1999)  for a review  of the United Kingdom's  experience  with inflation target-
ing, Freedman (2000)  for Canada, Archer (2000)  for New Zealand, Leiderman and Bar-Or
(2000) for Israel, and the  various chapters in Blejer, Ize, Leone, and Werlang (2000).
Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000) provide a general overview. Note that  the Euro-
pean Central Bank's monetary policy framework also incorporates elements of inflation
targeting.
41and  there  have been  episodes during  the  past  few years  when the  level of
interest  rates  necessary to  achieve the inflation target  was inconsistent  with
the  level required  to  maintain  the  nominal  exchange  rate  within  the  band
(Leiderman  and  Bufman  (2000)).  Spain  also maintained  an  exchange  rate
commitment  during  the  1990s and  therefore  cannot  be  viewed as a  "pure"
inflation targeter.  In any case, both  Spain  and Finland  dropped  formal tar-
gets for domestic inflation when they joined the European  single currency in
1999.
Table 1 provides a concise summary of the basic elements of the inflation
targeting  regimes in eight industrial  countries with  explicit targets  for infla-
tion, including  the date  their inflation target  was first introduced.  The table
reveals the following facts:
3  Most industrial  countries  specify their  inflation target  as a range,  and
the desired  target  is usually the  middle  of that  range-even  if this  is
not always made explicit.  Intermediate  target  ranges were established
in several countries  (such as New Zealand) to  reflect an  initially  high
level of inflation and the desire for gradual  disinflation.
*  Australia,  the United  Kingdom and Spain  explicitly exclude mortgage
interest  payments  from their headline measures; Australia,  in addition,
also excludes government-controlled  prices and  energy prices.  Canada
excludes  indirect  taxes  as  well as food  and  energy  prices.  Finland
excluded housing capital costs, indirect taxes and government subsidies;
Sweden has no formal exemptions.
* Formal  escape  clauses  (that  is, conditions  under  which  the  inflation
target  may be missed) are rarely specified and used.  Shocks to inflation
have been typically accommodated  by allowing fluctuations  within the
target  band  and/or  by relying on a measure of core inflation.
* The inflation target  typically represents  an understanding  between the
government  and the governor  (or president)  of the central bank  and is
not  a  legislated objective,  except  in New Zealand.  It  can  be changed
either  by an amendment  to central  bank legislation  or by a decision of
the government.
* Only  three  of the eight  central  banks  listed in the  table  now define a
term over which the inflation target  is to be met, following a transitional
42period  during  which an  explicit horizon  was specified.  In  most  cases
the target  horizon is indefinite.
* Responsibility  for setting  the  inflation  target  varies across countries.
The target  is determined  by the central bank in four of eight countries,
whereas the government sets the target  in two countries (Australia  and
the United  Kingdom).  The decision is joint  in the two remaining cases
(Canada  and  New Zealand).
*  In six of the  eight  countries,  the  central  bank  provides  (either  volun-
tarily  or by mandate)  a formal report  on inflation prospects.  Four out
of eight  central  banks  make available  to  the  public  explicit  inflation
forecasts.
The available empirical evidence also reveals that  inflation was on a down-
ward trend  in many of these countries  prior  to the introduction  of inflation
targets  and that  inflation persistence has continued to drop significantly after
the adoption  of inflation targets  (Siklos (1999)). There is also some evidence
suggesting  that  the degree of risk aversion to inflation volatility  in inflation-
targeting  countries  increased  significantly  during  the  1990s (Cechetti  and
Ehrmann  (1999)).  However, the  evidence  does  not  conclusively indicate
whether  inflation  targeting  has  led to  a  lowering of  inflationary  expecta-
tions and enhanced  credibility, thereby  mitigating  the real output  costs that
disinflation typically  entails.  In fact, sacrifice ratios  (which measure  the  cu-
mulative loss in actual  output  relative  to trend  output,  per percentage  point
fall in inflation)  do not  appear  to have been much affected by inflation  tar-
geting. 43 In addition,  as noted  by Bernanke,  Laubach,  Mishkin,  and  Posen
(1999), there  appears  to  be no strong  evidence that  the  introduction  of in-
flation targets  dramatically  affected inflation expectations,  as revealed either
by surveys or by the  level of long-term  nominal  interest  rates.  Inflation  ex-
pectations  have come down, in most cases, mainly because inflation-targeting
central banks were able to demonstrate  that  they were capable  of achieving
43It should ne noted, however,  that the computation  of the sacrifice  ratio is fraught
with difficulty-as can be inferred  from the previous  discussion  on the measurement  of
potential  output. Empirical  estimates  often  fail to disentangle  the impact  of disinflation
policies  from other shocks. Conceptually,  it also suffers  from serious shortcomings;  in
particular,  it focuses  only on short-run  costs and therefore  does not capture the longer-
run benefits  of disinflation.
43and  maintaining  low inflation.  A recent  quantitative  analysis  of the  per-
formance  of  inflation  targeting  in  New  Zealand,  Canada,  and  the  United
Kingdom  conducted  by Honda  (2000) provides some support  for this  view.
He estimated  an  unrestricted  VAR model with  four variables  (inflation, de-
viations of output  from trend,  the short-term  nominal interest  rate,  and  the
rate  of change of the nominal  exchange rate)  over a sample  period  prior  to
the introduction  of inflation targeting  and simulated  dynamically  the model
over the  period  following the  adoption  of inflation  targeting.  The  test  is
that  if predicted  values from  the model tend  to  overestimate  actual  values
of inflation  and  the  other  variables  in  the  system,  then  inflation  targeting
can be  deemed as having had  some favorable impact  on inflation  and  other
macroeconomic variables.  However, Honda found no evidence that  inflation
targeting  had an effect on either  inflation or any other variable in the system.
Of course, the power of alternative  stability tests  in a VAR context  is an open
issue, but  Honda's  analysis appears  to  be a promising way of analyzing the
impact  of inflation targeting  on actual  inflation performance.
6.2  Developing  Countries
Few developing  countries  have so far  adopted  inflation  targeting,  but  the
number  of potential  candidates  appears  to  have  risen  significantly  in  the
past  two or three years.  Not all developing countries that  have floated their
currency in recent years have adopted  an  (explicit or implicit)  inflation tar-
geting framework.  Mexico is a case in point.  Carstens  and  Werner  (2000)
have argued, for instance,  that  the high frequency and incidence of exogenous
shocks (both  domestic  and  external,  such as movements in  wages and  pub-
lic sector prices, and nominal  exchange rate  fluctuations)  to domestic  prices
makes the adoption  of an explicit inflation targeting  framework unfeasible in
the case of Mexico. In Peru,  the central bank announces  an annual  inflation
target  since 1994 but  does not have a formal inflation targeting  regime.  Nev-
ertheless,  both  countries  have been viewed by some observers  (see Mishkin
and Savastano  (2000)) as moving toward  the adoption  of such a framework.
By contrast,  Chile has  a  long history  of announcing  inflation  targets  (one
year  ahead)  that  goes back to  1990, although  it started  to  make  its  infla-
tion  report  publicly  available  only  recently  (May  2000).44  More  recently,
"Because Chile maintained a crawling  peg exchange  rate regime until September 1999,
some observers have argued that the adoption of a full-fledged  inflation targeting frame-
44Brazil, Thailand,  and South Africa adopted  such a regime, and several other
countries  (including those in East Asia that  adopted  a floating exchange rate
following the 1997-98  financial crisis) are currently pondering the feasibility of
such an approach. 45 Chile's experience is well documented  by Landerretche,
Morande  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1999);  accordingly,  this  section  provides  a
brief discussion of the  cases of Brazil, Thailand,  and  South Africa.
Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics  of inflation targeting  regimes
in Chile, Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand.  After the real crisis of January
1999 and the adoption  of a floating exchange rate, Brazil adopted on June 21,
1999 an  inflation  targeting  framework for monetary  policy  (see Bogdanski,
Tombini, and Werlang  (2000)). The inflation targets  as well as the tolerance
bands  are set by the  National  Monetary  Council, on the basis of a proposal
by the  Finance  Minister.  These targets  must  be  set  in principle  two years
in advance.  The  price index  chosen for setting  the  inflation  targets  is the
Broad  Consumer  Price  Index  (IPCA),  reported  by the  National  Bureau  of
Geography and  Statistics  (IBGE),  although  since March  2000 monthly  mea-
sures of core inflation have also been published  (see Figueiredo  (2000)).  The
choice of a full index was dictated  by the need to mitigate  potential  credibil-
ity problems  associated  with  perceptions  of deliberate  manipulation  of the
index.
The operational  framework of inflation targeting  consists of a set of mod-
els to support  the monetary  policy decision process (including  a small-scale
structural  econometric model, and short-term  univariate forecasting models),
supplemented  with  surveys of market  expectations  of major  macroeconomic
variables  (including  inflation and  growth).  The econometric  model  focuses
on the  aggregate  demand  channel  of monetary  policy, with  a  direct  effect
of changes in nominal  interest  rates,  and  an  indirect  effect through  relative
prices induced  by the  effect of changes in the  nominal  interest  rate  on the
exchange rate.
The targets  are considered to be met whenever the observed accumulated
inflation during  the period January-December  of each year (measured  on the
basis  of the  variations  in  the  IPCA  index)  falls within  the  band.  In  case
the  target  is missed,  the  central  Bank  Governor must  issue an  open  letter
to  the  Finance  Minister  explaining  the  causes of the  breach,  the  measures
work is only a recent phenomenon;  see Schaechter, Stone and Zelmer (1999, p. 12).
4 5In countries like Korea, for instance, the central bank is now required by law to set a
price stability target every year in consultation with the government.
45to  be adopted  to  ensure  that  inflation returns  to  the  target  band,  and  the
period of time  that  will be  needed for these measures  to have the  intended
effect. Since September  1999, the central bank also issues a quarterly  inflation
report  (simultaneously in Portuguese  and English) that  provides information
on current and future inflation performance, and the effect of monetary  policy
on prices. Minutes of the monthly Monetary  Policy Committee  meetings are
released with  a two-week lag, which is soon to  be reduced  to  one week.  In
June  1999, official inflation goals were announced for the coming three years:
8 percent  in  1999, 6 percent  in  2000, and  4 percent  in  2001 (accumulated
annual variations  by year end).  Tolerance intervals were set at ± 2% for each
year. As shown in Figure  7, inflation has been on a downward path since the
introduction  of the inflation targeting  regime and  has remained  well within
the target  band.
South Africa adopted  a full-fledged inflation targeting  framework in Feb-
ruary  2000, at a time when the country's  inflation performance  was continu-
ing to improve-falling  to 5.2 percent  in 1999 from 8.6 percent  in 1997 and
6.9 percent  in  1998.46 A key reason  to do so was the  perceived growing in-
stability  between monetary  aggregates  and inflation in a context  of financial
liberalization  (Schaechter, Stone and Zelmer (2000)). The inflation objective
is currently  expressed in terms of an adjusted  inflation rate,  the headline con-
sumer price index excluding mortgage  interest  costs.  Escape  clauses include
"major  unforeseen events"  deemed  to  be outside  the  control  of the  central
bank.  The target  range for the year 2002 is a band  of 3 to 6 percent  average
inflation.  This medium-term  target  was set in view of estimated  lags between
monetary  policy decisions and their  impact  on inflation:  changes in interest
rates  in South  Africa have been estimated  to  take  from 18 to  24 months  to
affect inflation.  The relatively large width of the band was chosen to account
for the fact that  the targeted  price index includes a large number of volatile
items,  whose movements  are  beyond  the  control  of the  central  bank.  At-
tempts  to  improve transparency  have taken  the form of public explanations
of the  monetary  policy  stance  following meetings  of the  Monetary  Policy
Committee  of the Reserve Bank  (although  full minutes  of the deliberations
are not  yet released),  the  creation  of a Monetary  Policy Forum  that  meets
twice a year  (in May and  November), and  the publication  of a semi-annual
46Before  that, the Reserve  Bank had an informal  goal  of maintaining  inflation  at a level
that would  be more  or less in line with the average  inflation  rate in South Africa's  major
trading  partners and international  competitors.
46Monetary  Policy Review (twice a year beginning  in  2001), which will rep-
resent the Reserve Bank's  inflation report.  At this  stage,  inflation forecasts
and the underlying  forecasting  models are not released to  the public.
Following the  collapse of the  Thai  baht  in  July  1997 (after  almost  five
decades of pegged exchange rate regimes), Thailand  adopted  a floating rage
regime under which monetary  targeting  was followed at first.  Quarterly  mon-
etary  base  targets  (agreed with  the  IMF)  were implemented  and  achieved
through  daily liquidity  management.  However, growing evidence of instabil-
ity in the  relationship  between money, output  and  inflation led Thailand  to
announce the adoption of inflation targeting  as a monetary  policy framework
in May 2000. Under this regime, monetary  policy is decided by the Monetary
Policy Board  (MPB), which was appointed  in April 2000 and comprises both
high-level central  bank  officials and external  experts.  An amendment  to the
Bank of Thailand  has recently been passed to give the MPB an official status
and  operational  independence  in conducting  monetary  policy.  At  the  same
time,  price stability  was reaffirmed as the overriding objective  of monetary
policy. The price index targeted  by the central bank is an index of core infla-
tion,  which excludes raw food and energy prices (both  components  deemed
to  be highly volatile) from headline  inflation.  The  target  core inflation  rate
is set  in  the  form of a band  of between  0 and  3.5 percent  for 2000-01 and
is explicitly  aimed  at  allowing the  Bank  of Thailand  to  cushion  temporary
shocks and  reduce  interest  rate  volatility.  At the  time  of the  adoption  of
inflation targeting,  headline and core inflation were running  at,  respectively,
2 percent  and  1.2 percent  on a yearly basis.  Monitoring of deviations  from
the target  band  is done on the  basis of quarterly  averages of core inflation,
to  avoid the high  degree of volatility  that  may characterize  monthly  obser-
vations.  If core inflation  breaches the  target  band,  the  MPB  must  explain
why the  breach  occurred,  identify  the  measures  that  it intends  to  take  in
response, and the amount of time required  to bring inflation back within the
desired range.  Finally, the first inflation report  was issued in July  2000 and
is to be  issued on a quarterly  basis; risks associated  with  inflation  forecasts
are shown in  fan charts,  as is now done by several other  inflation-targeting
central banks.
477  Some  Unresolved  Analytical  Issues
Analytical and operational aspects of inflation targeting regimes continue to
generate a large amount of research. How best to measure core inflation, for
instance, continues to be actively discussed. This section focuses on three
important issues of debate in the analytical literature.  The implications of
asymmetries (related to both policy  preferences  and the slope of the trade-off
between inflation and the output gap) for the design and operation of an in-
flation targeting regime are considered first. The implications of uncertainty
(regarding the variables to be measured, behavioral parameters, and policy
lags) are explored  next. Finally, the treatment of credibility  and reputational
factors in empirical models of inflation is examined.
7.1  Asymmetric  effects
7.1.1  Non-quadratic  policy preferences
The central bank's instantaneous policy loss functions (3) and  (13) were
taken to be symmetric; positive output gaps, for instance, were considered
to be just as costly as negative output gaps. Adopting this approach can be
justified not only because of its tractability but also because it can be viewed
as a reasonable  approximation of an underlying utility-based welfare  function
(Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)). In general, however,  the short-run cost
of disinflation may matter a great deal to the central bank and may lead to a
situation in which a higher weight is attached to negative output gaps-for
instance by adding a term that  is linear in  -y  in  (13).  As a result, even
if there is no long-run trade-off between output  and inflation, the optimal
inflation rate may be greater than 7r.
More fundamentally,  Orphanides  and Wieland (2000)  recently questioned
the use of a quadratic objective function for policymakers in the analysis of
inflation targeting regimes. They begin by noting that  (as discussed earlier),
in practice most inflation-targeting central banks specify a  target band as
opposed to point targets;  they then argue that the existence  of a target range
implies a nonlinear optimal policy rule. A simple way to specify policy pref-
erences that  are consistent with a target band is to write the instantaneous
loss function as, instead of (13):
Lt  (itr2  )+  Ay2  +  I  yti  (25)
48where 0  >  0.  As shown by  Orphanides  and  Wilcox  (1996), this  specifica-
tion implies an asymmetric  policy response:  as long as inflation is relatively
close to target,  the optimal interest  rate  policy is simply to stabilize output.
Otherwise,  policy should keep inflation within a range (that  varies positively
with  A), and then wait for favorable supply shocks (positive shocks to 6t)  to
move it closer to the desired value ir.
Orphanides  and  Wieland  (2000) considered in fact  a more general spec-
ification  than  (25),  namely,  a  zone-quadratic policy  loss function,  that  is,
a loss function  that  assigns a quadratic  loss to  inflation  deviations  outside
an  explicit  target  band  and  a  (near)  zero loss as long  as  inflation  fluctu-
ates within  the  band.  As a  consequence,  if the  central  bank  assigns some
weight to  fluctuations  in  output  (as is generally  the  case in  practice),  the
output  objective  will dominate  during  periods  when inflation  is within  the
band  and  will lose  (some) importance  when  inflation  is outside  the  band.
They  argued that  this  specification  of policy preferences  is consistent  with
the often-observed tendency  of central banks to  show overwhelming concern
with  inflation  only when it  is beyond some  range.  Using numerical  analy-
sis Orphanides  and Wieland  also found that,  with  nonquadratic  preferences
(and  a nonlinear  inflation-output  trade-off, as discussed below) uncertainty
due  to  unexpected  shocks has  important  effects on the  width of the  target
band  and  on the relative  size of the policy response  inside and  outside  the
band.  In particular,  the optimal policy rule under  uncertainty  does not  call
for a mechanical response only when inflation falls outside the band.  Instead,
it is optimal  to respond  to inflation deviations  already  within  the band  and
continue  to  do so more aggressively if inflation continues  to  evolve outside
the desired range. 47
Although  intuitively  appealing,  the  results  of Orphanides  and  Wieland
deserve further  scrutiny.  There appears to be growing evidence of nonlinear-
ities regarding  aggregate behavioral functions  (such as the Phillips curve, as
discussed below), but  the empirical research on the structure  of policy pref-
erences is less conclusive. Some other recent studies have, in fact, supported
the  standard  approach.  Chadha  and  Schellekens (1999), for instance,  sug-
gested by comparing  several alternative  specifications of the  central  bank's
loss function  that  the  assumption  of quadratic  losses may not  be too far off
the mark.  Of course, such results  may also be model specific.
47In  addition,  they showed that  in the  case where  the Phillips  curve  is linear,  the width
of the  band  increases  with the  variance  of shocks to inflation.
497.1.2  The  convex  Phillips  curve
As discussed earlier, establishing  forecasts in the context  of inflation target-
ing requires a reasonable  understanding  of the structure  of the economy and
adequate parameterization  of some key aggregate relationships,  most notably
between interest  rates  and output,  and between output  and inflation.  There
is a  growing literature  on the  Phillips  curve suggesting  that  the  relation-
ship between  changes in the  output  gap  and  inflation  may be  nonlinear  in
industrial  countries.  Specifically, it suggests  that  the  Phillips  curve  has  a
convex shape,  that  is, positive deviations of aggregate output  from potential
(or  booms)  tend  to  be  more  inflationary  than  negative  deviations  (reces-
sions) are disinflationary.  As discussed in detail by Dupasquier  and  Ricketts
(1998), there  are several analytical  models that  may justify  the existence of
an  asymmetric  relationship  between  inflation  and  the  output  gap.  One of
these  models emphasizes  the  role of capacity  constraints,  that  is,  the  fact
that  (some) firms may find it difficult to  increase their  capacity  to  produce
beyond  a certain  range in the very  short  run.  As a result,  when aggregate
demand  is increasing,  the  impact  on inflation  will tend  to  be  greater  than
during  periods  of low demand,  and  the  Phillips  curve  will have  a  convex
shape.
Taking  into account  these nonlinearities  in inflation  targeting  is impor-
tant  because they may imply the need for possible asymmetries  in monetary
policy decisions-for  instance,  the policy response to  deviations  of inflation
above target  may need to be stronger  than  those that  occur when inflation is
lower than  target.  Recent analytical research on this issue includes the study
by Schaling  (1999), who extended  Svensson's  basic  closed-economy model
presented  earlier to  consider the  case of a convex Phillips curve of the type
proposed  by  Chadha,  Masson,  and  Meredith  (1992),  and  Laxton,  Mered-
ith,  and  Rose (1995).  He shows that  the optimal  instrument-setting  rule is
asymmetric  and implies a higher level of nominal interest  rates than  the rule
derived by Svensson.
Specifically, suppose that  the Phillips  curve takes the  convex form
7rt  - 7rlt-1  =  1(Yt-1;  )  =  lYt-l  (26)
1-  alCyt-l
where, as before,  a,  >  0 and  0 < w  <  1 is a parameter  that  measures the
degree of convexity  of the  curve.  This  specification  is consistent  with  the
capacity  constraint  argument  stated  earlier.  The  0(.) function  is such that
500(0;  w) = 0; and  the slope of the output-inflation  trade-off is given by
ot  °ej- 1
[1-alwYt-l] 2 '
with  0'(0; w) = a1 and limit values of
limO' = a,,  lim  0' = oo,  lim  0' = 0.
w-S0  yt-I1/a  la  yt-iQ-00
The  quantity  l/law  represents,  thus,  an  upper  bound  that  the  output
gap  cannot  exceed in the  short  run.  As w  -4  0, (26) tends  to  a linear  rela-
tionship  between the  (lagged) output  gap and  (changes in) inflation.  Figure
8 summarizes  the properties  of the curve (26).
In addition  to  (26), suppose that  the output  gap evolves in a way similar
to (2) with, for simplicity, f2 =  1:
yt  =  lyt-1  - (it-I  - 1rt-1)  +  qt  (27)
where the aggregate demand disturbance,  nt,  is again assumed to be an i.i.d.
shock.
Assuming that  the  monetary  authorities  pursue  "pure"  inflation  target-
ing, and  that  the loss function takes the quadratic  form (3) given earlier, it
can be shown that  the optimal  interest  rate rule can again be found by solv-
ing  a period-by-period  problem  (as shown in  (7)) and  that  the  first-order
condition  is again  7rt+21t =  *  (see Schaling  (1999)).  The  instrument  rule,
however, is now a nonlinear  relationship  given by
r  1  _  alw(,3yt  - rt) (7t _  ir) +  1 +  1 - alw(2,31yt - rt)t  0=
where rt  =  - 7rt denotes the real interest rate.  FRom  this equation it can
be verified that,  for w -O 0, the interest  rate  rule boils down to
1
rt  =-(7rt  - )  +  (1 + O)yt,
a,
which is identical to (11). In general, however, the optimal short-term  interest
rate is a nonlinear  function of both deviations of current  inflation from target
and the output  gap.48  As shown by Schaling (1999), positive deviations  from
48It should be noted that Bean (2000) proposed a specification  of a convex  Philips curve
that  results in a linear policy rule.  In general, however, the  optimal rule will also be
nonlinear if the Phillips curve is nonlinear.
51the  inflation  target  imply  larger  movements  in  interest  rates  (in  absolute
terms)  than  negative  deviations.  In  the  same vein,  positive  output  gaps
imply  larger  increases  in  interest  rates  (in  absolute  terms)  than  negative
output  gaps.  In addition,  the nonlinear  rule implies that  increases in interest
rates  (in response,  for instance,  to  positive  output  shocks)  are larger  than
those obtained  with the linear rule-implying  that  the latter  underestimates
the  appropriate  level of the policy instrument.
The notion that  the output-inflation  trade-off depends on the initial state
of the  economy is crucial in  an inflation-targeting  framework.  However, all
the available evidence pertains  to industrial  countries (see most notably  Lax-
ton, Meredith,  and Rose (1995), and Pyyhtia  (1999)).  Tables 3 and 4 present
estimates  for six developing countries (Colombia, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, the
Philippines,  and  Thrkey) of linear  and nonlinear  Phillips  curves (using ordi-
nary least squares in the first case and nonlinear  least squares in the second),
along the  lines of Laxton,  Meredith,  and  Rose (1995), using quarterly  data.
The explained variable is the rate  of inflation INFL  =  A4 ln P,  where P  is
the  consumer price index, and  the explanatory  variables  are  (see Appendix
B for details):
*  Lagged  inflation  (one  and  two  periods),  to  capture  persistence  and
expectations.
*  the output  gap, GAP,  given by (the log of) the ratio  of actual  output,
Y, to potential  output,  YT.  The latter  is measured  using two different
filters: the standard  Hodrick-Prescott  filter (with a smoothing parame-
ter of 1600) and  a quadratic  trend.  For the  nonlinear  Phillips  curve,
the following specification is adopted:
f (GAP)  =  GAP-
where w is a parameter  to be estimated.49
49As noted  by Laxton,  Meredith,  and  Rose (1995, p.  353), because  positive output  gaps
have larger  effects on inflation  than  negative  output  gaps,  using detrended  actual  output
may  result  in downward-biased  estimates  of potential  output.  To  correct  for  this  bias,
they  measured  the  output  gap  in their  empirical  results  as ln[Y/(1  + a)YT]  where  a  is a
parameter  to  be  estimated.  Here,  however, preliminary  regressions  yielded  an  estimated
value of  a  that  was very  small and  never  significantly  different  from  zero.  Accordingly,
the  output  gap  was specified simply  as ln(Y/YT).
52*  Current  and  lagged values of the  rate  of change of the nominal  effec-
tive exchange rate,  to assess the direct  pass-through  effect of currency
depreciations.
* Foreign inflation, measured by the price of imported  goods.
In  addition,  following Leiderman  and  Bar-Or  (2000), the  possibility  of
a nonlinear  effect of exchange  rate  movements on  inflation  is tested.  The
assumption  is that  the  strength  of the  pass-through  effect depends  on  the
state  of the  economy;  the  extent  of pass-through  may be  larger  in  booms
than  in recessions,  when  falls in aggregate  demand  tend  to  put  downward
pressure on prices. 50 To capture  this  effect, an interactive  term  given by the
product  of the nominal  effective exchange rate  and  the output  gap is added
in the regression.
Consider  first  the  results  for the  linear  Phillips  curve given in  Table 3.
Overall, the regressions fit the data  fairly well. Lagged values of inflation are
significant in all cases, whereas the value of the interactive  term  is significant
only  for the  Philippines  and  Mexico (using  the  Hodrick-Prescott  estimate
of trend  output).  Foreign inflation is significant only for Korea; the  rate  of
depreciation  of the  nominal  effective exchange  rate,  by contrast,  is highly
significant (both  current  and  one-period  lagged values) except  for Colombia
and  Nigeria.  However, the  output  gap  is not  significant in  any  equation,
regardless of the  detrending  method  used or the lag considered.51
Consider  now the results  for the  nonlinear Phillips curve shown in Table
4.  The explanatory  power of the regressions  (as measured  by the  adjusted
R-squared  and  the  standard  error  of the  regression)  is about  the  same  as
before, and the degree of significance and size of the coefficients estimated  for
all variables,  except the output  gap,  are very similar.  Regarding  the output
50An alternative  assumption  worth exploring  in future research  is, as suggested  by Taylor
(2000), the  possibility  that  low inflation  itself may  result  in a lower pass-through,  due  to
reduced perceived persistence  of exchange rate movements.  Another  possibility  to consider
is  that  the  strength  of  the  pass-through  effect may  decline  over  time  as  the  inflation
targeting  regime gains  credibility.  This may  explain  why  in Chile,  for instance,  the  large
exchange  rate  depreciation  that  followed the  Asian  and  Russian  crises  in mid-1997  and
mid-1998 did not  translate  into major  upward  pressure  on domestic  prices.
51Higher-order  lags than  those  shown in the  table  were also  tried,  with  no success.  In
addition,  following Pyyhtia  (1999), the model was estimated  by entering separately  positive
and  negative  output  gaps;  the  results  remained  qualitatively  similar  to those  reported  in
the  table.
53gap,  the  results  now suggest that  the  coefficient w is significantly  different
from zero in virtually  every case and regardless of the detrending  technique
used.  The coefficient of the function f(GAP),  however, is significant only at
the  10 percent  level, and  only  for the  Philippines  (where the  current  value
of GAP  is used, with  a quadratic  trend  used to  measure  potential  output)
and Nigeria (where a two-period lag is used, with the Hodrick-Prescott  filter
used).
The linear and  nonlinear  specifications are compared  using a non-nested
test, the J test developed by MacKinnon, White,  and Davidson (1983), which
is briefly discussed in Appendix  B. The  results  indicate  that  for Colombia,
the  linear  model  is rejected  against  the  nonlinear  alternative,  regardless  of
whether  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter  or  quadratic  trend  filter  is used.  For
Korea, both  model hypotheses  fail to be rejected, suggesting that  the data  do
not  provide enough information to  discriminate  between them.  For Mexico,
even though  the linear model is rejected  against  the nonlinear  one when the
Hodrick-Prescott  filter is used, both  models are rejected  when the quadratic
trend  method  used.  For Nigeria,  the  nonlinear  model  is accepted  against
the linear alternative  when the Hodrick-Prescott  filter is used; but  failure to
reject both  models occurs when the quadratic  trend  method  is used.  In the
case of the  Philippines,  the  nonlinear  model is accepted  against  the  linear
specification.  By  contrast,  in  the  case of Turkey,  the  nonlinear  model  is
rejected  against  the linear  alternative  using the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter and
at a 10 percent  significance level. Both  models cannot  be rejected  when the
quadratic  trend  is used in the regressions.
Although  suggestive, the above results  should be viewed as preliminary.
There is clearly a need for further testing  to  assess other  possible sources of
nonlinearities  in the Phillips curve, as discussed by Dupasquier  and Ricketts
(1998). Although  this  is a difficult task,  the source of the nonlinearity  in the
Phillips curve is important  from a policy viewpoint,  because they may have
very different policy implications.  With nonlinearities,  the policy rule is state
contingent;  parameters  (elasticities)  that  capture  the  response  of  interest
rates  to  movements  in  the  output  gap  and  deviations  of current  inflation
from target  depend  on the  current  levels of inflation  and  the  output  gap.
This has considerable practical  implications in the present context,  given the
relative lack of experience that  inflation-targeting  central banks (particularly
those in developing countries)  have had with the conduct of monetary  policy
during a cyclical downturn.
547.2  Uncertainty  and  optimal  policy  rules
The implications  of uncertainty  for the design of policy rules under  inflation
targeting  has received considerable  attention  in  the  most  recent  literature.
Analytically,  it is convenient to  distinguish  between  four sources of uncer-
tainty:
*  Uncertainty  about  some of the  deterninants  of inflation, which relates
to the fact that  some economic series are unobservable and must be es-
timated.  The most obvious example in the present case is the measure-
ment of potential  output  in the calculation of the output  gap.  Potential
output  is very often approximated  by trend  output  (as done earlier),
but  alternative  detrending  techniques  may  sometimes  give large  dis-
crepancies. 52 ... 3
o Uncertainty  about  the  parameters  of the  model,  which can  be  inter-
preted  in two ways: either  the  underlying model itself is uncertain,  or
the  "true"  model is deterministic  but  policymakers do not  know it for
sure and  must  estimate  it.  Econometric  techniques  normally  provide
a  sense of the degree of uncertainty  that  accompanies  empirical  esti-
mates,  because they yield not  only point  estimates  of parameters  but
also their  variances and  covariances.
* Uncertainty  about  the  transmission  lag and  the  timing  of policy  ac-
tions.  The transmission lag depends on a variety of economic and insti-
tutional  factors, such as the degree of development of financial markets
and the intensity  of competition  on both  the supply  and demand  sides,
the  degree of trade  openness,  and  the  composition  of private  agents'
financial wealth. 54
52Note that  the error in measuring potential output is not necessarily  problematic if it
takes an additive form and is uncorrelated over time.
53A related problem is the significant revisions  in economic  time series (due to changes in
seasonal adjustment factors, re-definitions,  and so on) that often occur after a preliminary
release of data-particularly  those dealing with the real sector.  Large revisions in the
variables  entering the instrument rule, in particular, may complicate the use of preliminary
data as a basis for policy decisions.
5'As discussed earlier, there are lags in the response of aggregate demand to changes
in interest rates, and lags in the response of inflation to the output gap.  There are also
lags in the response of inflation expectations to policy changes, as well as the response of
inflation to changes in inflation expectations. In addition, as noted ealier, there are lags in
55*  Uncertainty  about  the  nature and  degree of persistence  of shocks that
the economy is subject to, that  is, whether the shocks are on the supply
or demand  side of the  economy, and  whether  they  are  temporary  or
permanent.
It has been shown that,  whereas some of these sources of uncertainty  cause
optimal policy to become more cautious,  others  have the opposite  effect. To
illustrate  these  results  and  their  implications  for  inflation  targeting,  it  is
sufficient to consider two analytical  examples: uncertainty  about  parameters
and  uncertainty  about  the degree of persistence  of macroeconomic variables,
including  inflation.
In a seminal  paper,  Brainard  (1967) argued that  when the  policymaker
is uncertain  about  the  effect of its  actions,  it  may be  optimal  to  adopt  a
more gradual  policy stance  than  under  certainty  (or, more generally, under
certainty  equivalence,  which  holds in  a  linear  model  with  a  quadratic  loss
function  and  additive  shocks).  To illustrate  the  implications  of Brainard-
type uncertainty,  consider again Svensson's model of strict  inflation targeting
described  earlier  (equations  (1)-(4)).  To simplify the analysis,  suppose that
output  affects immediately  inflation,  a,  =  1,  31 =  0,  and  that  there  are
no supply  shocks (Et = 0 for all t).  The behavioral  equations  of the  model
therefore  become
7rt-  rt-1  CelYt,  (28)
Yt  =-02(4t-1-'  t-1)  +  77t,  (29)
where the  demand  shock qt is once again an  additive,  serially  uncorrelated
shock with zero mean.  Substituting  (29) in (28) yields
7rt+l  =  1t  - 72t  +  nt+l,
where -y =  (1 +±a112)  and  1Y2  a  102.  Assuming the same intertemporal  loss
function  as before (equation  (4)) and setting  for simplicity the target  ir = 0,
the optimal  interest  rate  rule can be shown to  be
it=-7t  (30)
72
the  response  of aggregate  demand  to changes  in relative  prices induced  by exchange  rate
changes, and lags in supply response  to exchange rate-induced  movements  in the  domestic
price of imported  inputs.
56As noted  earlier, this  rule is certainty  equivalent:  the  same interest  rate
rule would be optimal in a world with no uncertainty  about  aggregate demand
shocks.  But  suppose now that  the central  bank  does not  know for sure the
values of 'Yl and  72;  all that  is known is that  these  parameters  are  drawn
from independent,  normal  distributions  with means 71 and  Y2  and  variances
oa and  a 2,  respectively.  In  this  case, it  can be  shown  (see Martin  (1999))
that  the  optimal instrument  rule becomes
it=  Y  t2  + 2 rt.  (31)
Y2  2 
This  equation  shows  that  as  uncertainty  about  the  parameters  in  the
transmission  process of policy shocks increases (that  is, as a 2 rises), the opti-
mal instrument  response to movements in current inflation becomes smaller. 55
The  fundamental  reason  for  this  result  is the  following.  As shown  earlier
(equation  (8)) the per-period  loss function  can be decomposed into the sum
of the  squared  expected  deviation  of each  variable from  its  target  (or the
squared  bias),  and  the  conditional  variance of that  variable.  With  additive
uncertainty,  the variance is independent  of the policy rule, and  so policy de-
cisions aim only at minimizing expected deviations  in inflation.  By contrast,
under  uncertainty  about  the  parameters  of the  model,  the  variance of (fu-
ture)  inflation  depends  on the  level of nominal  interest  rates;  in  particular,
large movements in the policy instrument  in response to  deviations  between
actual and targeted  inflation tend to reduce bias, as implied by the first term
in (8)-at  the cost,  however, of increasing the  variance of inflation, the sec-
ond term  in  (8).  The central  bank  will therefore  internalize  this  effect by
choosing a lower optimal level of interest  rates.56 A similar result  would hold
in a more general, linear-quadratic  setting  in which the central bank  pursues
several policy objectives simultaneously.
By and  large, model-based simulation  studies,  for instance  by Ha (2000),
Martin  and  Salmon  (1999), and  Sack  (2000), have confirmed  the  practical
importance  of the  Brainard  effect.  The  optimal  interest  rate  rule  calls for
more gradual  adjustment  in the presence of parameter  uncertainty.  In par-
ticular,  Ha (2000) examined, using a numerical  model for New Zealand, the
impact  of uncertainty  about  the  transmission  lag of monetary  policy  (that
55Note that  as  U2 tends  to  zero, (31) becomes  identical  to  (30).
56It  is important  to note,  however, that  Brainard  himself qualified this  result  by showing
that  it  does  not  necessarily  hold  when  the  covariance  between  parameters  (the  policy
multiplier,  in his example)  and  the  additive  disturbance  is sufficiently negative.
57is, lag uncertainty  regarding  the timing  of policy actions,  as opposed  to the
effect of these actions, as in Brainard's  analysis) on the setting  of monetary
policy instruments  in the context of inflation-forecast  based rules.  His analy-
sis showed that  indeed less aggressive policy rules  are more  robust,  in the
sense that  they  are  less affected by uncertainty  about  the  monetary  policy
transmission  lag.  However, at  the same time, more aggressive rules  tend to
produce  lower inflation variability.  Sack  (2000) showed that  accounting  for
parameter  uncertainty  in deriving an optimal interest  rule from an estimated
VAR model  and  a  quadratic  loss function  in  inflation  and  unemployment
helps  to  explain  the  observed  tendency  for the  Federal  Reserve  to  change
its policy rate  (the federal funds rate)  only gradually,  despite  the absence of
interest  rate  smoothing considerations  by the central bank.
By contrast,  several authors  have shown that  uncertainty  about  the de-
gree of persistence in the economy can lead to a more aggressive policy than
under certainty.  Notable studies are those of Soderstrom  (1999) and Shuetrim
and Thompson  (1999). In Soderstrom's  model, for instance,  it is uncertainty
about  the degree of persistence  of inflation itself that  may lead to this result.
Without  full information  regarding  inflation  persistence,  a  cautious  mone-
tary policy may result in inflation not approaching  the target  at  the desired
rate,  or even diverging from the target.  The central bank  can lower this  risk
by implementing  large adjustments  in interest  rates, thereby  reducing uncer-
tainty  regarding  the  path  of inflation.  This  more aggressive policy leads to
the expectation  that  inflation will return  to  target  more quickly, so that  the
implicit targeting  horizon is shortened.57
The sharp  differences in these results  suggest that  more quantitative  re-
search is needed to fully understand  the impact of uncertainty  on policy rules
under  inflation targeting.  In  particular,  it may well be  that  the  impact  of
uncertainty  on the  optimal  policy rule may depend on which parameter,  or
which behavioral relationship,  is being considered in a structural  model.  Put
differently, uncertainty  about  particular  parameters  may be of relatively lim-
ited importance  for the conduct of monetary  policy, whereas others  may have
an unduly large effect on the setting  of policy instruments.  Identifying  which
parameter(s)  matter(s)  may well be model-specific.
5 "Note  that  if the central bank cares only about stabilizing inflation, the implicit tar-
geting horizon is alread as short as possible (that is, equal to the control lag). In this case,
it is not affected by uncertainty about the persistence of inflation.
587.3  Endogenizing  Reputation  and  Credibility
The foregoing  discussion highlighted the need, in setting policy instruments
in an inflation targeting framework,  to account for the trade-off  between the
cost of having inflation above target (which is reduced if disinflation  is faster)
and the cost of output fluctuations (which  is increased  if disinflation  is faster).
The trade-off arises because of the assumption that to reduce inflation the
central bank must necessarily  induce a (temporary) reduction in output.  In
that regard, it is important to note that  the extent and duration of the re-
duction in output depend crucially on the credibility of the commitment to
the inflation target and its evolution. The more credible the commitment
becomes over time, the faster inflation expectations will fall, and the lower
will be the output cost of reducing inflation. More generally, accounting for
changes in credibility in forecasting inflation and simulating policy shocks
may be important in the first stages of implementation of an inflation tar-
geting framework,  particularly in countries where the degree  of confidence  in
the central bank's commitment to low  inflation is not well established.
Nevertheless,  there have been relatively few  attempts to endogenize  cred-
ibility in empirical macroeconomic  models used for forecasting and policy
analysis  under inflation targeting. One reason may be the difficulty  of opera-
tionalizing theoretical concepts of credibility and its determinants. A simple
approach is to assume that the expected inflation rate, lt/t-1,  is a weighted
sum of lagged  inflation, 7rt-1,  and the inflation target, 7r,  with relative weights
of 1 - at and  at,  respectively:
7rt/t-1  -(1-Ut)7rt-1  +  ±Ut.  (32)
The weight  on the announced inflation target ot can be viewed  as a mea-
sure of policy credibility,  which can  be modeled as {  At-1  when  'P  0
at  =  Aatl+T(7rtj--,  7rt-2-l,  *--) -*  ,  (33)
Aa  t-  + 1  when  - 1
where 0 <  A <  1 and  IF(.) is a function of past inflation forecast errors,
with the properties that  'I  -*  1 when these errors become very small and
I-  0 when these errors become very large.  Expectations are thus com-
pletely backward-looking  when T  -*  0 (because at  -O  0 as well), whereas
when 'I  -*  1 full credibility  is achieved  (at  -*  1), with expectations depend-
ing only on the announced target. Isard, Laxton and Eliasson (2001)  provide
59a more elaborate  treatment  of this  approach  to  endogenizing credibility.  A
key conclusion that  emerges from simulation  studies  based  on expectations
formation  schemes similar  to  (32) and  (33) is that  endogenous  policy credi-
bility strengthens  the case for the type of forward-looking inflation forecast-
based rules discusser earlier.
An alternative  and conceptually appealing approach to endogenizing cred-
ibility and  learning in a tractable  manner  is the one pursued  by Drazen and
Masson  (1994) and Agenor and Masson  (1999), who view credibility  as con-
sisting  of two elements:  an  assessment  of the central  bank's  "type"  (which
could be termed reputation),  and (for a given type) an assessment of the prob-
ability  that  the central  bank  will actually  decide to  stick to  the announced
policy (maintain  inflation close to target)  in the presence of adverse shocks to
prices. 58 In this setting,  inflation expectations  will reflect assessments  about
the  central  bank's  "type",  as captured  by the  relative  weights that  the  au-
thorities  attach  to each of their policy objectives, which are not known by the
public.  In addition,  private  agents-knowing  that  random  shocks will alter
the  balance  of costs  and  benefits  associated  with  maintaining  the  inflation
rate  close to  target-will  reevaluate  on the  basis of observed  variables  the
probabilities  that  a particular  type of policymaker  will decide to stick to the
inflation target  in the future.  Put  differently, if there is significant persistence
in the effects of policies, then  a restrictive  policy carried  out  today  (which
lowers inflation but  also reduces output)  may make it less likely that  such a
policy will be continued  in the future.
To illustrate  this approach, consider again the per-period  policy loss func-
tion under  flexible inflation targeting  described earlier  (equation  (13)).  The
first component  of (lack of) credibility, the probability  that  the central  bank
put  a  high  weight on  limiting  output  fluctuations,  can  be  modeled  using
Bayesian updating,  under  the  assumption  that  there  are two possible  types
of policymaker, each with a known set of weights on its objectives:  a "weak"
central bank,  who sets A = Aw, and a  "tough"  central bank,  whose value of
A is AT  <  Aw.  Thus,  the policy loss function  can be written  as:
Lt  2  Ay2  '  A  Aw  (34)
2  2'AT  < Aw
5 "An  alternative approach consists in defining credibility as the ability of the central
bank to precommit its actions, that  is, its capacity to convince  private agents that it will
carry out policies that may be time inconsistent. See, for instance, Cukierman (1992).
60In each period private agents calculate  ex ante the likelihood of each type
deciding  to  deviate  from  the  inflation target.  If inflation  remains  close to
target  ex post, this  would give information  about  whether  the  central  bank
is weak (even if the shocks cannot  be observed),  so that  initial  priors about
that  probability  are updated  on the basis of the relative likelihood that  each
policymaker  would have deviated  from target,  given the distribution  of the
unobserved  shocks.
In this  framework inflation expectations  depend  on the probability  that
the  central  bank  is weak or  tough  as well as the  ex ante probability  that
a given type  will decide to  deviate  from the  inflation  target  as a  result  of
random  supply  shocks,  as  captured  by  Et.  Private  agents  do  not  observe
the supply shock; they form their expectations  using an information  set that
includes  variables  known as of the end  of t  - 1, that  is,  the  lagged values
of output,  interest  rates,  and inflation,  and whether the policymaker  has al-
lowed inflation to deviate from target  or not.  The central  bank observes the
supply shock, and  chooses whether  or not  to adjust  interest  rates  and  keep
inflation close to  target.  In general,  the central  bank  will allow inflation  to
deviate significantly from target  when a negative shock to output  is so large
that  the  cost  of maintaining  inflation  close to  its  target  value will exceed
those  associated  with  flexibility (that  is, higher inflation).  Formally, let  LT
be the  value of the loss function  if inflation  is kept close to  target  through
changes in  interest  rates,  and  L D  the  value  when  it  is allowed to  deviate
significantly from target  with  no change in policy instruments.  The  central
bank  will maintain  interest  rates  constant  when LD - LTF  < 0.  Using, as be-
fore, equations  (1) and  (2) to characterize  the economy, it can be established
on the  basis  of the  results  derived  by  Agenor and  Masson  (1999) that  for
-D  - L F  to  be negative  requires the  supply  shock Et to  be  relatively  large
compared  to  a  threshold  value,  5h, which depends  on  the  type  of central
bank  and  other  variables  in  the  model.  The threshold  level is lower for a
weak central  bank  than  for a tough  central bank  (EW  < E).
The expected  inflation rate  in this  setting  is the product  of the probabil-
ity of deviating  from target,  Pt, and the size of the deviation  from target,  xt,
which may or may not be constant  over time.  In turn,  the private sector's  as-
sessment of Pt is equal to the probability of a weak central bank, Ot, times the
probability  that  a weak central bank  will devalue, pw, plus a corresponding
term  for a tough  central bank:
Pt = StP+  (1-  t)p[  (35)
61Expected  inflation is thus
ptxt  [=  [tPt  + (1 - Ot)pT]xt.  (36)
Given knowledge of the authorities'  objective function  and  of the  distri-
bution of the supply  shock, the private  sector can calculate the probabilities
pw and  pT, which can be defined as
Pt =  Pr(Et  >  Eh)-
Finally, the probability  of a weak policymaker,  Ot, can be  assumed to  be
updated  using a Bayesian  rule, starting  from a prior  estimate  At-1. Specif-
ically, because  private  agents  observe the  absence of deviations  of inflation
from target  at  time  t  - 1, they will revise 7rt-I on the  basis of the  relative
likelihoods  that  the  two types  would have chosen  not  to  deviate  from  the
inflation target:
( 1  Pt-)Ot  o-  + (  1 11  )  Ot-1)
The above approach may prove fruitful as a way to endogenize credibility
and  reputation  in  macroeconomic models designed to  predict  inflation  and
analyze the performance of alternative  policy rules, particularly  in countries
where, to begin with,  the degree of confidence in the central bank's  ability to
maintain  its  comrnmitment  to  price stability  is relatively  low. However, other
approaches  are also possible, and sorting out  the advantages  and limitations
of each of them  remains  a matter  for further  research.
8  Summary  and  Conclusions
In the past  few years a number'of central banks (in industrial  and developing
countries alike) have adopted  an explicit inflation targeting  framework for the
conduct of monetary  policy. This paper  attempted  to provide a (mostly ana-
lytical) discussion of the issues involved in designing such a framework, with
some emphasis on the particular  features  and recent experience of developing
countries.  The first  part  of Section II described  an analytical  framework for
a closed economy, due essentially to  Svensson (1997b, 1999b).  The  analysis
showed two main  results.  First,  because of lags in the  transmission  process
of short-term  interest  rates  to  prices,  inflation  targeting  implies  inflation
62forecast targeting.  The central  bank's  forecast becomes an explicit interme-
diate  target.  FRom that  perspective,  then,  inflation targeting  can be viewed
as  a  monetary  policy  framework under  which  policy  decisions are  guided
by expected  future  inflation relative  to  an  announced  inflation  target;  the
forward-looking instrument  rule takes into account  lags in the  transmission
process.  Second, if the  central  bank,  in  addition  to  seeking to  achieve its
inflation target,  aims at stabilizing  output,  it should  allow for a  slower ad-
justment  of the inflation forecast to the target  value compared  to a situation
in which the inflation target  is the only goal. Extension  of the analysis to an
open-economy setting  showed that,  given the critical  role that  the  exchange
rate  plays in the transmission process of monetary  policy, inflation targeting
may lead to a relatively high degree of output  volatility by inducing excessive
fluctuations  in interest  rates.
Section III compared  inflation targeting  regimes with  money supply  and
exchange  rate  targeting  regimes.  It  was noted that  monetary  targeting  re-
quires a stable relationship  between monetary  aggregates and the price level,
but  that  such stability  had  become  elusive as a  result  of financial  liberal-
ization  and  abrupt  changes in  inflation expectations.  Regarding  exchange
rate targeting,  it was noted that  a number of developing countries  have been
forced to abandon  their  exchange rate  pegs in recent years as a result of un-
sustainable  speculative  pressures.  These developments led in many cases to
the  adoption  of inflation targeting  as an operational  framework for conduct-
ing monetary  policy.
Section IV discussed three  basic requirements  for implementing  an infla-
tion targeting  framework, namely, central bank independence,  the absence of
implicit  exchange rate  targeting,  and  transparency  in the conduct  of mone-
tary  policy.  It  is now well recognized that  openness  and  transparency  play
an important  role in achieving credibility in monetary  policy. The announce-
ment  of inflation  targets  communicates  the central  bank's  intentions  to the
financial markets  and  to the  public, and  in so doing helps  to  reduce uncer-
tainty  about  the future  course of inflation.  In that  sense, transparency  and
accountability  act  as constraints  on the  temptation  to  adopt  discretionary
policies.  The  risks associated  with  the pursuit  of an  implicit  exchange rate
target  were also highlighted.  It  is crucial for the  central bank  to  be  able to
convince the  public that  the inflation target  will take precedence  over other
policy goals in case of conflict. In particular,  if the central bank  is also con-
cerned about fluctuations  in the nominal exchange rate  (as may be the case in
countries where the pass-through  rate to  domestic prices is high or when the
63short-term  foreign-currency liabilities of the private  sector are large) there  is
a risk that  inflation targets  may lack credibility-undermining  the operation
of the inflation targeting  framework.
The operational  framework of inflation targeting  was discussed in Section
V. Among  the  issues reviewed were the  measurement  of inflation  (includ-
ing sources of imperfection  in traditional  measures), whether  a target  band
for inflation should be chosen, the  time horizon of monetary  policy, difficul-
ties associated  with forecasting inflation, and whether  asset prices should be
taken  into  account  in  targeting  inflation.  It  was noted,  in particular,  that
the width  of the  inflation target  range depends  on the variability  of shocks
to inflation, the  policy horizon, and  the desired speed of adjustment  to eco-
nomic disturbances-which  itself depends  on the relative weight attached  by
the  central  bank  to  output  fluctuations  and  the  desired  degree  of interest
rate smoothing.  In addition,  there is also a trade-off between credibility  and
flexibility:  if the  band  is  made  too  wide to  provide  more flexibility  (that
is, more scope to accommodate  transitory  shocks to  inflation),  the  inflation
target  may lose credibility  and  inflation expectations  may remain  high.  It
was also  noted  that  there  may  be  several reasons  why central  banks  may
want to respond  to financial prices in their  pursuit  of price stability.  In par-
ticular,  shocks to financial prices that  are not  driven by fundamentals  may
destabilize the economy through  their effects on aggregate demand,  in which
case the  central  bank  may want  to offset them.  however, it was also noted
that  asset  prices are  determined  by arbitrage  equations  in  which  expecta-
tions of future  returns  play an important  role. If expectations  are subject  to
large  and  unpredictable  shifts,  these  prices may contain  limited  additional
information  about  current  and  future  economic conditions.  Finally,  it  was
pointed  out  that  inflation  forecasts are in practice  based  on a  combination
of quantitative  models (generally small in size), indicator  variables  (such as
survey expectations),  and  qualitative  judgement.
Section  VI reviewed the  recent  experience  of industrial  and  developing
countries  with  inflation  targets,  with  a  particular  emphasis,  in  the  latter
group, on Brazil, Thailand,  and South  Africa. The evidence clearly suggests
that  the adoption  of an inflation targeting  regime was not  by itself sufficient
to  dampen  inflation  expectations  and  help countries  to  deliver consistently
better  inflation  performance.  Nevertheless,  for a  subset  of countries  (most
notably  Canada,  New Zealand,  Sweden,  and  the  United  Kingdom),  infla-
tion persistence  dropped  significantly after  the adoption  of inflation targets,
perhaps  as a result  of a significant and  credible shift in policy preferences.
64The  last  section  focused  on some  ongoing issues of debate  in  inflation
targeting,  namely  the role of nonlinearities  and  asymmetric  effects (related
to both  the structure  of policy preferences and structural  relationships,  most
notably  the Phillips  curve), uncertainty  (about  behavioral  parameters  and
the  transmission  process of monetary  policy), and  how to  account  for cred-
ibility  and  reputational  factors in empirical  macroeconomic models.  It  was
argued that  the first two issues have important  implications  for the design of
optimal  instrument  rules  and  the  operation  of a state-contingent  targeting
regime.  Specifically, it was shown that  whereas  uncertainty  about  parame-
ters  may lead  to  more caution  in  the  manipulation  of policy instruments,
uncertainty  about  the  degree of persistence of inflation may lead to  a more
aggressive, as opposed  to  a more gradual,  interest  rate  policy.  New results
regarding  the convexity of the  Phillips curve were also presented  for six de-
veloping countries  (Colombia, Korea,  Mexico, Nigeria, the  Philippines,  and
Turkey).  Comparison  of the  linear  and  nonlinear  specifications  using  the
MacKinnon-White-Davidson  non-nested test provided mixed support  for the
latter.  Finally,  it  was argued that  accounting  for changes in credibility  in
forecasting  inflation and  simulating policy shocks may be important,  partic-
ularly  in countries  implementing  an  inflation  targeting  framework  from an
initial position  of low confidence in the central bank's  commitment  to price
stability.
The main conclusion of this paper is broadly in line with several existing
studies: inflation targeting  is a flexible policy framework that  allows the cen-
tral  bank  to  exercise  "constrained  discretion",  as emphasized  by Bernanke,
Laubach,  Mishkin,  and  Posen  (1999, p.  293).  In middle-  and  high-income
developing economies that  have relatively  low inflation  to  begin  with,  rea-
sonably well-functioning financial markets,  and can refrain  from implicit  ex-
change rate  targeting,  it has the potential  to  improve the design and  perfor-
mance of monetary  policy compared with  alternative  operational  procedures
available to central banks.  There are, of course, technical  requirements  (such
as  adequate  data  on  prices,  sufficient understanding  of the  links  between
instruments  and  targets  of monetary  policy, and the ability  to forecast rela-
tively well price developments) that  may not be satisfied in all countries  and
to  the  same extent.  But  such requirements  should not  be overstated;  fore-
casting capability,  for instance,  can never be perfect  and sensible projections
always involve qualitative  judgement.  A more important  and  difficult task,
in  many cases, may be to  design or improve the  institutional  framework in
order to allow the central bank an effective degree of independence  in pursu-
65ing the goal of low and  stable  inflation without  undue  pressure  to  stabilize
output  fluctuations  or alleviate the public debt burden  through  low interest
rates.
66Appendix  A
The  Optimal  Instrument  Rule
under  Forward-Looking  Expectations
This  Appendix  discusses the  derivation of the optimal  interest  rate  rule
implied by inflation  targeting  under  rational,  forward-looking expectations.
Following Clarida,  Galf, and  Gertler  (1999),  consider a  closed economy in
which the  Phillips  curve and  aggregate  demand  are given by the  following
equations:
7rt =- a  yt + a 2Etirt+i + -t,  (Al)
yt = Etyt+l  - 3(it - Et7rt+l) +  77t,  (A2)
where 0 <  a2 <  1  and, as before, 7rt is the  inflation rate,  yt the  output  gap,
it the nominal interest  rate,  and  Et and  t are disturbances  that  obey
Et  Pest-i +  Vt,  (A3)
71t  =P7t7-i  + (t,  (A4)
where  0 < pe, p,  < 1 and  vt  and (t  are random shocks with zero mean and
constant  variances, given respectively  by a2 and a  .
Equation  (Al)  relates inflation to the  current value of the output  gap (as
opposed to the lagged value) and the one-period ahead expected future infla-
tion rate.  It  can be derived from a Calvo-Taylor model with  staggered nomi-
nal wage and price setting;  see Roberts  (1995) and Fuhrer  (1997a, 1997b)). 59
Equation  (A2) relates output  to its future value and the ex ante real interest
rate.  It  can be  derived by log-linearizing the  first-order  condition  for con-
sumption  maximization  obtained  in a representative  agent model and impos-
ing equilibrium of the goods market  (see Clarida,  Galf, and  Gertler  (1999)).
For simplicity,  changes in  interest  rates  are assumed  to  affect immediately
current  output.
The key difference-which  is readily apparent  by iterating  (Al)  and  (A2)
forward-in  this  specification with forward-looking expectations  is that  out-
put  depends  on current  and future  values of the real interest  rate  (and thus
59It can also be shown that  a,  is inversely related to the degree of price rigidity; the
longer prices are held fixed (on average), the less responsive  is inflation to cyclical fluctu-
ations in output.
67on future  policy decisions), whereas  inflation depends  on current  and  future
values of the output  gap.  This dependence makes calculation  of the optimal
instrument  rule more involved.
The central bank's  policy objective is, as in (14):
min Ut =  Et {  ah-t  [(rh  _*)+AY2  }  (A5)
where A > 0.
Under discretion,  the central bank  tales  expectations  as given in solving
its  optimization  problem.  To derive the optimal  policy rule proceeds in two
stages:
*  The objective  function  (A5) is minimized by choosing Yt and  7rt, given
the  Phillips curve (Al).  This is possible because  no endogenous  state
variable  appears  in  the  objective  function;  thus  future  inflation  and
output  are  not  affected  by  today's  policy  decisions  and  the  central
bank  cannot  directly  affect private  expectations.
*  Conditional  on the optimal  values of Yt and  7rt, the value of it implied
by the aggregate  demand  equation  (A2) is determined.
The first stage consists thus  in choosing Yt and  7rt  to  minimize
(7rt-*) 2 +  +Xt
2
where
xt  =  Et  +E  [(2rh  -7r)  + Ayh] }
subject  to  (using (Al)):
7t  =  alYt + Zt,
where zt = a 2Et7rt+l + Et. The first-order conditions  for the first-stage  prob-
lem are
-7rt  - f + At = °,  \Yt - Atal = O,
where pt is a Lagrange  multiplier.  Combining these conditions  gives
7rt =  * - ( A )Yt-  (A6)
68Substituting  this  expression in (Al)  for yt yields
2
Irt =-yC7rt  - T) + a2Et7rt+l +  Et,
that  is
alir  Ce2AEt7rt+l  AEt
__t  __  +  +  . +  +  (A7) Art  +  2  +a2 I  I  A  + alQ
This  equation  can be solved by using the method  of undetermined  coef-
ficients.  Conjecturing  a solution of the form
7rt =  Kl1  r + /c2Et,  (A8)
implies that  7rt+l =  ±lk  + 
1c2Et+l, so that,  using (A3):
Et7rt+1  =  'l'r  +  ±  2EtEt+l  =  Kllr  +  K2P6t.
Substituting  this  expression in  (A7) and  rearranging  terms yields
7rt  =  (R  +  . +(1  ± 021t2Pe)  (A9)
Equating  coefficients in (A8) and  (A9) yields
a  ± 2 +  COK  A(I+ a2 i, 2P,)
1=Al + a:¢/z  2  c  A  (  +  a  2Etp)
which can be rearranged  to give
a 2  A
A(l  -a2)  +  a2<1,  K2 =  (1-  a2P,)  + a2 '
Thus,  the solution for 7rt  is
7r-  =  ±1,R  + ASEt,  (AlO)
where
A(l - a2P,) ±  al
Substituting  (AIO) in (A6) yields
Yt =  (-(  )(7rt-r)  =-(cl)  {(cl  - 1)Yr  +  AOEt},
69that  is
Yt  = A1r - ajOet,  A =  a,  (1-c)  (All)
The second stage of the solution procedure  consists in rewriting  (A2) as
it=  {(Etyt+1 - Yt) + 7t} + Et7rt+ 1,  (A12)
and  substituting  for Etyt+l  - Yt.  From (A3) and  (AIO), Et7rt+l is given by
Et7rt+j = Kir  + AOEtEt+j  =  K17r + AOpeEt,  (A13)
whereas from (A3) and  (All):
,tyt+l = Ai  - aQOpe&t
Using this  expression together  with  (All)  yields
Etyt+l-  Yt =  l(l  - pe)OEt.  (A14)
Equation  (A13) can be  rewritten  as
OcEt  =-l1r  +  Et7rt+j
Ap,  Ap,
Substituting  this  result  in (A14) yields
Etyt+l-  yt =  aiKi(l  - P)T  +  a<  (l  - pj  Et7rt+l.  (A15) Ap,  Ap,
Substituting  (A15) in  (A12) and  rearranging  terms  yields  the  optimal
interest  rate  rule:
it=P)  +  la'(  -P  Et7rt+l + 77t} +  Et7rt+l,
or equivalently
it = Q* +  5Et7rt+l  +  (A16)
where
air,,(l- Pe)  +  =  a1ct(l  Pe&)  >
f3Ap  '  Ao/3p,
70Thus,  the optimal  policy rule  (A16) also calls for inflation  forecast  tar-
geting.  Because  E  >  1, an  expected  increase  in  future  inflation  calls for a
more than proportional increase in the current  nominal interest  rate, in order
to  lower the  real interest  rate  today  and  reduce aggregate  demand  now.  If
A  -+  0 (strict  inflation  targeting)  then  1/E -+  0, AOp,  0 and  tc  -*  1, so
that  (A13) yields
Et7rt+l  =
which is analogous to  what  Svensson's  model would predict  in  the  absence
of a  lag between  changes  in  the  output  gap  and  inflation  (see  (9) in  the
text).  Put  differently, strict  inflation  targeting  is optimal-in  the  sense of
equating  the  inflation  target  and  the  one-period  ahead  expected  value  of
inflation-only  if the  central  bank  has  no  concern for output  fluctuations.
Otherwise,  convergence to  inflation back to  target  following a shock will be
gradual,  as implied  by  the  discussion  of flexible inflation  targeting  in  the
text.  The optimal  rule also calls for completely offsetting aggregate  demand
shocks because they  do not  imply a short-run  trade-off between  output  and
inflation.6 0
A more general specification of the Phillips curve (Al)  and the  aggregate
demand  equation  (A2) in which both  backward-  and  forward-looking  com-
ponents  are present can be considered, as for instance  in the New Keynesian
models discussed by Fulurer (1997a, 1997b):
lrt  =  alYt +  ,o7rt_-  + (1 - p)a2EtIrt+1 + et,
Yt =  - 8lYt-1  +  (1  - O)EtYt+l  -
1 2 (it  - Et7rt+l)  +  qt,
where 0 <  p, 0 <  1.  Equations  (1) and  (2) can be obtained  from the  above
specifications  by setting  y  =  0  =  1.  Following Clarida,  Gali,  and  Gertler
(1999, pp.  1691-95) it can  be shown that  the  qualitative  properties  of the
optimal  instrument  rule derived earlier remain  essentially the same.
60Equations  (A10) and  (All)  can be  used  to  illustrate  the  output-inflation  variability
tradeoff  that  arises  in  the  presence  of  supply  shocks.  In  general,  a}  =  a2022,  and
a2 =  A 292a2.  When  A -+  0 (the case of strict  inflation targeting),  0 -l/c,  and  a2  - 0,
y-  ca/al.  And when A -+  oo (the case when stabilizing  output  is the only policy goal),
9 -+  0 and  (by  applying  L'Hospital's  rule)  AO  -S  1/(1  - C2pe).  As a  result,  aV  - 0 and
a,r  - ore/(l  - a2P,)-
71Appendix  B
Data  Sources,  Causality  Tests,
and  Nonnested  tests  for the  Phillips  Curve
The data  used to produce Figure  1 are obtained  from the quarterly  data-
base  compiled  by  Agenor,  McDermott  and  Prasad  (2000).  The  bivariate
VAR includes the money market  rate  and  the discount rate  (in that  order).
Estimation  periods  are  1995:1-1999:4 for Colombia,  1978:1-1999:3 for Ko-
rea,  1978:1-1996:4 for Malaysia,  1983:2-1996:4 for  Tunisia,  1986:2-1996:2
for Turkey, and  1994:1-1999:4 for Uruguay.  The optimal  lag length,  chosen
on the basis of the  Akaike Criterion,  was 2 for Colombia,  2 for Korea,  2 for
Malaysia, 2 for Tunisia,  1 for Turkey, and 5 for Uruguay.  Standard,  bivariate
Granger causality  tests  showed also that  the discount rate  causes the money
market  rate  only in  Korea  (F-statistic  =  3.122, P-value  =0.049).  There  is
two-way causality  in  Malaysia  and  Turkey,  and  no  statistically  significant
evidence of causality  in Colombia, Tunisia and Uruguay.61
The variables used in the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 are defined
as follows. Inflation  (INF) is the log difference of consumer price index (IFS
code 64) between  periods  t  and  t-4.  GAP  is the log difference between  the
seasonally-adjusted  industrial  production  index (IFS  code 66c or 66ey)  and
its  trend  value,  calculated  by using  either  the  Hodrick-Prescott  method  or
a quadratic  trend  (obtained  by regressing output  on a  constant  term,  time
and  time  squared).  The  growth rate  of the nominal  effective exchange  rate
(NEERGR)  is the log difference of the nominal  effective exchange rate  (IFS
code eneer) between periods  t and  t-4.  An increase in the nominal  effective
exchange rate  is a depreciation.  The growth rate  of import  prices  (PMGR)
is the log difference of the import  price index  (IFS code 75 or 75d) between
periods  t and t-4.  For Nigeria, imported  inflation is measured  by the growth
rate of export  prices in developed countries  (PXGR  DEVED),  which is the
log  difference of the  export  price  index  (IFS  series code  74d  and  country
group code 110) of these countries between periods  t and  t-4.
The estimates  of the linear and  nonlinear  Phillips curve models reported
in  Tables 3 and  4 are compared  using the  J-test  proposed  by MacKinnon,
61These results should be treated with some caution because during the estimation pe-
riod monetary policy procedures changed significantly  in some of the countries considered.
In Turkey,  for instance, the repurchase rate has become the main interest rate instrument
in recent years.
72White,  and Davidson (1983). Specifically, suppose that  the hypotheses  to be
tested  are:
Ho: y = ao +,3 0f (x, y) +  eo,
H1 : y =  a,i + /lx  +  e1,
where y is the endogenous variable, x a vector of exogenous variables,  ai, Bi
and  -y the  parameters  to  be  estimated,  and  ei  error  terms  with  classical
properties.
The basic idea of the  J -test  is that  if one of the models  (say, the  model
specified under  Ho) is the correct  one, then  the fitted  values from the other
model  (corresponding  to  H1) should not  have any  explanatory  power when
estimating  the  Ho model.  In  practical  terms,  testing  the  Ho model against
the H1 model proceeds as follows. First,  estimate  the H1 model and retrieve
the  fitted  values.  Then  estimate  the  Ho model  including  the  fitted  values
from the H1 model.  If the fitted  values from the H1 model enter significantly
in the Ho model, reject the Ho model.
Similarly, the H1 model can be tested against the Ho model by estimating
first the Ho model and  calculating the fitted  values, then  estimating  the  H1
model including  the fitted  values from Ho.  If the fitted  values from the  Ho
model enter  significantly in the  H1 model, reject  the  H1 model.  If the test
fails to  reject only one model, this  model is said to  be superior  to the  other
one.  If both  models are rejected  against  the alternative,  this  suggests that
another  model is needed.  If the tests  fall to reject both  models, the  data  do
not provide enough information to discriminate  between the two alternatives.
The results  are reported  in the text.
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Developing  Countries:  Volatility  of Consumer  Price  Inflation  and  Food  Price  Inflation
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Developing  Countries:  Consumer  Price  Inflation  and Inflation  Volatility
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Brazil:  Consumer  Price  Inflation  and Inflation  Targets,  1995-2002
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Industrial  Countries: Basic  Features of  Inflation  Targeting Regimes
Separate  Publishes
Country  Inflation  Excluded Items from  Inflation  Inflation  Target  Contingencies  for  Breaches  Targeting  Adoption  Date  Inflation  Who Sets  Inflation
Measure  Measure  Calculation  Period  of the Inflation  Target  Horizon?  (mmnVddyy)  Report?  Target?  Forecast?
Mortgage interest  2 to 3 percent on average over the business  Over the cycle  None  None  01/01/93  No  Govemment  No Australia  CPI  Government-controlled  pnices  Nn  oe  0119  o  oenet  N
Energy prices  cycle
2 to 4 percent by the end of 1992
Canade  cpll  lIndirect  taxes  1.5 to 3.5 per-cent  by June 1994 (original)  Annual  None  Yes  02126191  Yes  Joint  No Food and energy prices  (revised) I to 3 percent Dec 1993 to
Feb 20013
Housing capital costs
Finland  CPI  Indirect taxes  2 percent annual average from 1995  Annual  None  No  02/02/93  No"  Central bank  No
Govemment  subsidies
Short-term influences embodied
14 to 15 percent (1991-92)  in certaincopntsfth
Israel  CPI  None  less than 4 percent (1999)  Annual  prce index, e.g. prices of fruits  Yes  01/01/91  Yes  Central bank  Yes
3 to 4 percent (2000-1)  and vegetables, housing, and 3 to  4 percent (2000-1)  ~~~~~~~imports.
3 to 5 percent (Dec 1990);
Commodity prices  2.5 to 4.5 percent (Dec 1991)  'Unusual'  events that do not
New Zealand  Cptl  Govemment-controlled  pOces  1.5 to 3.5 percent (1992:Q1-04)  Annual  generate general inflationary  Yes  03102190'  Yes  Joint  Yes
Interest,  credit charges  0 to 2 percent (1993-96)  pressures.
0 to 3 percent since December 19969
3.5 to 4 percent (June 1996)
3 to 3.25 percent (1997:Q1)
Spain  CPI  Mortgage interest  costs  3 percent upper limit for 1997  Annual  None  Yes  01/01/95  Yes  Central bank  No
2.5 to 2.75 percent upper limit for late 1997
2 percent for 1998'
Sweden  CPI  Nominally none but condifional  ito3percentsince1995  Annual  None  No  01/15/93  Yes  Centralbank  Yes on indirect taxes, subsidies
United Kingdom  RPI  Mortgage Interest payments  I to 4 percent until June 1997 elections  Annual  None  No  10/08/92  Yes
9
Govemment  Yes 2.5 percent since June 1997
Source: based on Allen (1999), Archer (2000). Leiderman and Bar-Or (2000), Schaechter, Stone and Zelmer (2000), and national central bank reports.
'The  Govemors,  however, 'available'  to report  on the conduct of monetary policy twice a year  to the House of Representatives Standing  Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration. 2
Although the target is officially specified in terms of overall  CPI, the Bank of Canada focuses on the CPI excluding food, energy, and the effect of indirect taxes.
'Renewed in February 1998.
4Finland  reports  quartedy on the inflation  outlook in its Monthly Bulletin.
'Since  December 1997, the CPI excluding credit services is targeted. Before that date, overall CPI was targeted. In late 1999, mortgage interest rates were removed from the index.
'The  term of the new Policy Targets Agreement (PTA)  coincides with the current term of the Govemor, which expires August  31, 2003.  The PTAs  were agreed to in December.
'The Reserve Bank's announced  policy included a specific target for inflation and a specific date for that target to be achieved as eady as mid 1989 (Archer (2000)).
"The Law of Autonomy was put in place in June 1994 and, although the inflation target was announced  in December 1994, it was formally adopted only as of January 1,1995.
Between 1995 and 1997 the aim was to reduce inflation  to the 2 percent range.  In 1998, the aim  was to keep the annual inflation rate 'close  to 2 percent" during the year. 9
Only since 12 June 1997.Table 2
Developing Countries: Basic Features  of Inflation Targeting  Regimes
Country
Brazil  Chile  South Africa  Thailand
Inflation Measure  CPI  CPI  CPI  CPI
Excluded  Items from Inflation  None  None  Mortgage  interest  costs  Raw  food  and energy
Measure  prices
Inflation Target  1999:  8 percent±2 percent  1991:  18  percent  2002:  3 to 6 percent  2000-01:  0-3.5  percent
2000:  6 percent  t 2 percent  2000:  3.5  percent
2001:  4 percent  ± 2 percent  2001  onwards:  3 percent  ± 1  percent
2002:  3.5 percent  i  2 peroent
Calculation Period  Annual  Annual  Annual  Annual
Contingencies for Breaches  None  None  Major  unforeseen  events  None
of the Inflation Target  outside  central  bank
control
Targeting Horizon?  Yes  No  Yes  Yes
Adoption Date  (mmfddlyy)  06/21/99  09/01190  2/1/00  05/01/00
Separate Inflation Report?  Yes  Yes'  Yes
3 Yes
2
Who Sets Target?  Joint  Central  Bank  Central  Bank  Central  Bank
Publishes Inflation Forecast?  Yes  Yes  No  Yes
Source:  based  on Landerretche,  Morande  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1999),  Bogdanski.  Tombini  and  Weriang  (2000),  Schaechter,  Stone  and Zelmer  (2000),  and
national  central  bank reports.
'The first  inflaton report  was published  in May 2000  and will  be released  three imes  a year  (January,  May, Septernber).
2The  first inflabon  report  was published  in July 2000.
3An  inflation  report  has been  prepared  since the  end of 1996  by the  Reserve  Bank. At this stage,  the report is not  distributed  outside  the Bank.Table 3
Estimation  Results: Linear Phillips Curve
Dependent variable:  inflation  rate (Ordinary  Least Squares)
Colombia  Korea  Mexico  Nigeria  Philippines  Turkey
HP  QT  HP  QT  HP  QT  HP  QT  HP  QT  UP  QT
C  0.026  0.026  0.007  0.008  0.021  0.017  0.021  0.025  0.015  0.020  0.012  0.022
(2.237)  (2.289)  (3.216)  (3.232)  (2.956)  (2.454)  (1.951)  (2.218)  (2.618)  (3.707)  (0.802)  (1.165)
INFMj  1.097  1.096  0.822  0.794  1.312  1.284  1.461  1.454  1.207  1.119  0.872  0.866
(9.490)  (9.474)  (27.641)  (19.011)  (14.429)  (12.962)  (15.514)  (15.371)  (11.325)  (11.454)  (18.009)  (17.145)
INF,.2 -0.226  -0.266  -0.465  -0.436  -0.566  -0.572  -0.443  -0.389
(-1.955)  (-1.956)  (-6.401)  (-5.534)  (-5.958)  (-6.012)  (-5.048)  (-4.781)
GAP,  0.019  -0.002  -0.019  0.021  -0.018  0.002
(0.465)  (-0.283)  (-0.473)  (1.009)  (-0.283)  (0.154)
GAP,.,  -0.136  0.021  0.107  -0.040
(-0.619)  (1.380)  (1.356)  (-0.815)
GAP,.  0.101  -0.011
(0.873)  (-0.649)
NEERGR,  0.107  0.109  0.180  0.190  0.118  0.097  0.387  0.374
(6.582)  (6.834)  (5.687)  (6.401)  (5.385)  (4.530)  (8.825)  (8.152)
NEERGR,.,  -0.052  -0.048  -0.058  -0.072  -0.275  -0.276
(-2.900)  (-2.658)  (-1.408)  (-1.830)  (-5.333)  (-5.290)
GAP,*NEERGR,  0.807  0.733
(1.832)  (3.388)
GAP,.,*NEERGR,,  0.753  -0.030
(1.935)  (-0.632)
PMGR,  0.074  0.045
(3.418)  (2.017)
PMGR, l  0.094  0.086  0.058  0.047
(5.026)  (4.457)  (1.190)  (0.925)
PXGR_DEVED,  0.063  0.070
(0.761)  (0.844)
Adj. R
2 0.792  0.792  0.958  0.958  0.982  0.981  0.897  0.896  0.946  0.953  0.925  0.923
Standard error ofregression  0.015  0.015  0.011  0.011  0.031  0.032  0.055  0.056  0.021  0.020  0.038  0.038
Total  Number of  76  76  79  79  79  79  81  81  64  64  75  75
Observations
Period  1980:1 - 1998:4  1980:2 - 1999:4  1980:2 - 1999:4  1979:3 - 1999:3  1981:1 - 1999:3  1981:2-  1999:4
Note: t-statistics  are in parentheses.  C is a constant  term. INF  is the inflation  rate. GAP  is the log  difference  of output  and trend component  of output  which  is calculated  using either Hodrick  and Prescott  method (11) or quadratic
trend method  (QT). NEERGR  is the  growth  rate of nominal  effective  exchange  rate. PMGR  is the growth  rate of the import  price  index. PXGKRDEVED  is the growth  rate of the export  price index  of industrial  countries.Table 4
Estimation  Results: Non-Linear  Philips  Curve
Dependent  variable:  inflatfon rate (Non-Linear Least Squares)
Colombia  Korea  Mexico  Nigeria  Philippines  Turkey
HP  QT  HP  QT  HP  QT  HP  QT  HP  QT  HP  QT
C  0.028  0.027  0.007  0.007  0.022  0.016  0.023  0.022  0.015  0.026  0.013  0.016
(2.380)  (2.291)  (3.183)  (3.296)  (3.119)  (2.205)  (2.137)  (1.878)  (2.621)  (4.395)  (0.847)  (1.010)
INF, ,  1.096  1.093  0.823  0.821  1.289  1.332  1.489  1.455  1.209  1.125  0.880  0.873
(9.531)  (9.351)  (27.486)  (27.228)  (14.253)  (14.205)  (15.881)  (15.251)  (11.375)  (11.472)  (17.784)  (18.010)
INF.- 2 -0.234  -0.225  -0.446  -0.473  -0.599  -0.566  -0.448  -0.430
(-2.029)  (-1.923)  (-6.176)  (-6.284)  (-6.323)  (-5.877)  (-5.105)  (-5.043)
AGAPE)  -0.001  0.002  -0.004  0.002  0.017  0.067
(-0.195)  (0.105)  (-0.748)  (0.232)  (0.724)  (1.721)
AGAP,. 1)  -0.073  -0.026  -0.022  0.026
(-0.458)  (-0.774)  (-0.542)  (0.548)
flGAPs2)  0.087  0.015
(1.605)  (0.146)
co  0.049  0.052  0.047  0.055  0.081  0.060  0.051  0.043  0.045  0.042  0.048  0.044
(48.498)  (2.782)  (19.978)  (13.177)  (5.713)  (10.175)  (27.717)  (4.806)  (13.894)  (19.390)  (15.601)  (26.268)
NEERGR,  0.110  0.109  0.207  0.197  0.119  0.095  0.389  0.382
(6.819)  (6.795)  (5.855)  (6.365)  (5.340)  (4.564)  (8.601)  (8.719)
NEERGR,.,  -0.052  -0.050  -0.080  -0.091  -0.289  -0.281
(-2.922)  (-2.796)  (-1.840)  (-2.308)  (-5.464)  (-5.458)
GAP,*NEERGR,  0.763  0.835
(2.120)  (4.146)
GAP,.,*NEERGR,,  0.642  -0.008
(2.102)  (-0.189)
PMGR,  0.072  0.039
(3.305)  (1.804)
PMGR,j  0.092  0.096  0.053  0.069
(5.019)  (5.150)  (1.076)  (IA01)
PXGR_DEVED,  0.028  0.070
(0.343)  (0.829)
Adj. R
2 0.794  0.789  0.958  0.958  0.983  0.981  0.900  0.895  0.946  0.956  0.923  0.924
Standarderrorofregression  0.015  0.015  0.011  0.011  0.031  0.032  0.054  0.056  0.021  0.019  0.039  0.038
Total  Numberof  76  76  79  79  79  79  81  81  64  64  75  75
Observations
Period  1980:1 - 1998:4  1980:2 - 1999:4  1980:2 - 1999:4  1979:3 - 1999:3  1981:1 - 1999:3  1981:2 - 1999:4
Note: t-statistics  are in parentheses. C is a constant  term. INF is inflation  rate. GAP  is the log  difference  of output  and trend  component  of output  which  is calculated  using  either Hodrick  and Prescott  method  (HP) or  quadratic
trend  method  (QT).AGAP)  is a finction  of  GAP such  that (oa/(nD-GAP)}-os.  ot  is  apsrameter identifying  maximum  short-run  level  of GDP.  Its starting  value  is 0.049. NEERGR  is the growth  rate of nominal  effective exchange
rate. PMGR  is the growth  rate of the import  price index.  PXGR_DEVED  is the growth  rate of  the export  price  index of industrial  countries.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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